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"Leading Political Scientists Warn of Threat to American Democracy in
Rare Nonpartisan Statement"'
I. INTRODUCTION

The United States has spent billions of dollars and has put the lives of
its soldiers on the line for the purported purpose of spreading democracy in
other countries, 2 while at the same time, Americans have allowed their own democracy to come under threat. The threat does not come from abroad, but is
homegrown. It is bound up in a vicious cycle of both economic and political
inequality, the centrifugal forces of which have created an ever-widening gap
between those who have and those who do not have: a stake in America, a
voice and hand in shaping America's future, and the ears of others who are
shaping that future.
I

Press Release, American Political Sci. Ass'n, Leading Political Scientists Warn of Threat to
American Democracy in Rare Nonpartisan Statement (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/
imgtest/taskforcepress.pdf. See also E. J. Dionne Jr., Poor Version of Democracy, WASHINGTON
POST, June 11, 2004, at A25 (calling attention to and commenting on the Task Force report),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33 144-2004JunlO.html. Although
not conceived as such, this Article, in effect, is a response to the challenge raised by Nockleby and
Curreri, "that those who wish to defend the civil justice system against retrenchment should explicitly address how the legal system changed from 1900 to 1980 to grant far more protections to
citizens." John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of
Tort Retrenchment, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2005).
2
There have been between 76,075 and 82,883 Iraqi civilian deaths since the beginning of the
war according to The IRAQ BODY COUNT Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). There have been over 3,849 American military casualties since the beginning
of the war, http://www.antiwar.com/casualties/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). As of Nov. 4, 2007,
there have been 4,142 coalition deaths, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/
forces/casualties (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). By the end of 2006 the U.N. High Commission for
Refugees estimated that some 3 million Iraqis had been displaced (about half within the country
and half outside of the country). Patrick Cockburn, Review of the Year: Iraq (A Nation Soaked in
Blood Tears Itself Apart), THE INDEPENDENT, Dec., 29, 2006, http://news.independent.
co.uk/world/middle east/article2110653.ece. The economic costs are well over $400 billion for
Iraq alone and over 600 billion if Afghanistan and other expenditures on the war on terror are
included. AMY BELASCO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN
AND THE OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR EXPENDIURES SINCE 9/11 4 tbl. 1 (2007), available at

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.
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This gap between the "haves" and "have nots" cuts across both socioeconomic aspects of life (education, jobs, income, mobility) and civil and political aspects of life (the ability to participate in civic and political life, through
voting, volunteering, protesting, donating, etc.). This gap skews both the input
into those who are elected to represent the people and the output, or the responsiveness, of those elected to serve the needs and preferences of the people.
Gross inequality in political voice is bound up with a lack of responsiveness and
accountability and this, in turn, leads to the erosion of government interventions
to correct or counterbalance the ever-widening gap between the "haves" and the
"have-nots" in America. Just as democratic progress fostered progressive tort
reform, democratic decay over the last few decades has fostered regressive
changes in the law of torts. Just as progressive tort reform in turn helped to consolidate democracy, the regressive tort reform movement has helped further
entrench both economic and political inequality, and the further erosion of democracy.
Part II of this Article provides an introduction to the history of democracy and tort reform in the United States. Although the seeds of democracy and
democratic tort reform were sown well before America's founding, as this section demonstrates, neither began to blossom until after the Second World War.
Post World War II Democratic progress both led to, and was consolidated by,
progressive developments in tort law during the same period. Part III draws on
recent literature in the field of political science detailing the extent of U.S. economic inequality, while Part IV draws on that literature to show how economic
inequality is bound up with political inequality and the decay of American democracy. As Part V illustrates, interventions by the courts and legislators in the
area of torts follows this pattern. This can be seen by the Supreme Court's
counter-democratic interventions, as well as the bulk of tort "reform" efforts
since the 1980s.
II. THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY AND TORT REFORM IN AMERICA
For democracy to be meaningful, the people must have some degree of
stake in their country's future. Without a stake, there is little reason to participate or to contribute-if one wants buy-in, there needs to be something to buyinto. If people are going to lend their voices and hands to the future of America,
they should have not only something to gain, but something to lose, should that
project fail.
No one expects American democracy to be primarily direct, either in the
sense of the people directly making decisions about how the U.S. is governed,
or in the sense of getting direct results from one's input. It is an accepted fact
that most contributions are contributions to a process that must be mediated by
institutions that one hopes are democratically representative and accountable.
Further, the vote is only one mechanism for ensuring that officials represent the
people. For democracy to operate between elections, the people not only need a
voice, they need to reach the ears of those who govern.
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The account of how American democracy has run off its tracks, presented in this Article, is not based on an elaborate or idealistic view of democracy. It is not based on shattering the illusion of direct democratic participation,
on the dream of a truly deliberative democracy, 3 or even of a republican democracy.4 The standard that is being proposed to measure or evaluate the health of
American democracy is not the equal provision of conditions for human development and self actualization, 5 nor even the ideal of equal concern and respect,
although the U.S. is faltering on all these accounts.6 The critique that follows is
based on the failure to achieve even the modest ambitions of representative democracy. The standard is based on the basic notions propounded by one of
America's greatest Presidents and one of America's foremost democratic theorists, namely, that democracy consists of "government of the people, by the
people, for the people" 7 and that a "key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals."8 Democracy requires accountability and respect for
the rule of law, and this entails equality before the law. It also requires transparency and access to accurate information, for without it, "the people" have no
3
The argument does not rely on a conception of democracy that is as rich as deliberative
democracy, which requires not only that representatives represent the populace, but that they
should have inclusive deliberations about the decisions they make and justify their decision with
publicly acceptable reasons.
AMy GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY? 3 (2004).
4
JURGEN HABERMAS, Three Normative Models of Democracy, DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE:

CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLrrICAL 21 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (comparing liberal, republican, and deliberative forms of democracy).
5
MacPherson identifies the underlying moral value of democracy as "provid[ing] the conditions for the free development of human capacities, and to do this equally for all members of
society." C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 58 (1966).

6

Ronald Dworkin's view of our Constitution is "that it aims to create ...

a 'partnership'

rather than a majoritarian form of democracy by insisting that all citizens are entitled to an equal
role and voice in their self-government, that government at all levels must treat citizens with equal
concern, and that government must leave individual citizens free to make the personal decisions
for themselves that they cannot yield to others without compromising their self-respect." Ronald
Dworkin, Judge Roberts on Trial, 52 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 16 (2005)
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18330#fnr6 (referring to his elaboration of this ideal in RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) and
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2000)).

7
Abraham Lincoln, 16th President of the United States of America (1861-65), The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). The U.S. State Department begins its discussion of the definition
of "What is Democracy" with Lincoln's definition. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WHAT IS
DEMOCRACY? (1998), http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm.
8

ROBERT DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971). Although the view

of Democracy expounded by Dahl is not as rich or substantive as the requirements for political
justice put forward by John Rawls, it is consistent with them. In fact, although it is not a sufficient
condition for political justice, it is probably a necessary condition. See the discussion of Rawls's
principles of justice, infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. On Rawls' account and the account detailed below, economic inequality becomes problematic from the standpoint of capitalist

democracy when it undermines political equality and fair equality of opportunity. See id.
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chance of authentic participation or of holding representatives accountable. As
detailed below, American democracy is failing, because its government is not
of, or for the people; those who govern are not responsive to the people. This is
true, both in the general and in the specific case of tort reform.
Although it is not uncommon to hear of references to the founding as a
democratic founding, 9 this is not an accurate depiction of American history. It
took the United States nearly 200 years to achieve a level of political participation to justify the claim that it was a democracy. As C.B. MacPherson pointed
out long ago:
In our Western societies the democratic franchise was not installed until after the liberal society and the liberal state were
firmly established. Democracy came as a top dressing. It had
to accommodate itself to the soil that had already been prepared
by the operation of the competitive, individualist, market society, and by the operation of the liberal state, which served that
society through a system of competing though not democratic
political parties. It was the liberal state that was democratized,
and in the process, democracy was liberalized.' 0
Democracy did not begin to take root in America until well into the 20th
century, and it took until the 1960s for it to really begin to blossom. It is difficult to speak at all about American democracy prior to 1920, when women finally won the right to vote," and as Alexander Keyssar notes, despite the much
earlier formal emancipation of African-Americans, until the 1960s, most African-Americans could not vote in the South. 12 "As late as 1950s, basic political
rights were denied [not only to those blacks in the South but] ... to significant
pockets of voters elsewhere, including the illiterate in New York, Native Americans in Utah, 13many Hispanics in Texas and California, and the recently mobile
everywhere."'

Tort reform since the 1980s has largely consisted of tort retrenchment
back to the 1950s and before. The notion that the current wave of retrenchment
See, e.g. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835); Lance Banning, Preface to LIBERTY AND ORDER: THE FIRST AMERICAN PARTY STRUGGLE xiii, xiii (Lance Banning ed.,
9

2004) (describing our revolution as the first democratic revolution). Even Jay Feinman refers to
the United States at its founding as "the newly democratic" America. JAY M. FEINMAN, UNMAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW 56 (2004).
10
MACPHERSON, supra note 5, at 5.
11 U.S. CONST. amend XIX. Note that twelve of the western territories along with New York
extended the franchise to women before the Amendment. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 211-18 app. at 390 (2001)

(Table A.20 States and Territories Fully Enfranchising Women Prior to the Nineteenth Amendment).
12
KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at xvi.
13
Id. at 316. Universal suffrage is not a right enshrined in our Constitution.
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is compatible with democracy may be based, in part, on the misconception that
the founding was democratic14 and that the U.S. has been a democratic republic
ever since. However, the classical liberal state was not democratic at its inception, and thus, it should not be surprising that the common law and tort law as
they existed at the time of the founding were similarly not supportive of democracy. 15 The common law system largely presumed equality and freedom, while
exploiting the lack thereof. For example: limiting access to courts for the poor,
allowing those with superior bargaining power to bind and keep the gains of
unequal power through contract and tort law, and providing remedies that replicated status quo inequalities. It was not until the early 1900s that tort law
started its modem trend towards 16the expansion of liability, a movement that did
not fully take off until the 1960s.
The 1960s and 1970s were decades of considerable progress in civil and
political rights, as well as in socio-economic rights.' 7 These advances came
from increased political participation, 8 and from executive,' 9 legislative 20 and
14

As David C. Williams notes, the American Revolution was a conservative revolution; the

revolutionaries claimed that they were defending the British Constitution from the British Crown
and Parliament. David C. Williams, The ConstitutionalRight to "Conservative" Revolution, 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv 413, 414, 430-31 (1997). Although the U.S. eventually went somewhat
further in creating republican legislatures and in protecting natural rights, rather than merely the
customary rights of Englishmen, the bulk of U.S. constitutional structures and rights derived directly from British structures and rights. Id. at 431. See also JOHN REID, THE ANCIENT
CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTY (2005) (arguing that justifications for the
American revolution were grounded in claims that Britain was violating the "Ancient Constitution" otherwise known as "the common law tradition," and that revolutionary calls were actually
justified as restorative rather than revolutionary).
15
The lawyers who were largely responsible for articulating, developing and defending the
English common law which the U.S. inherited (Coke, Seldon and Hale) were apposed to the absolutist theories of monarchical power as advocated by the Stuart Kings, but they also "accepted as
natural monarchical government, a very limited franchise, and a patriarchal and profoundly inegalitarian social order that doled out privileges on the basis of status and sanctioned various forms
of servitude." John C.P. Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of Tort Law: Due Process and the
right to a Lawfor the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 532 (2005).
16
FEiNMAN, supra note 9, at 53.
17
President Carter even signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights in 1977, although it was never ratified by Congress. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL
INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN
RIGHTS
TREATIES
(2004),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
18 Paul Allen Beck & M. Kent Jennings, PoliticalPeriodsand PoliticalParticipation,73 THE
AM. POL. SCI. REv. 737 (1979); Thomas E. Cavanagh, Changes in American Voter Turnout, 19641976, 96 POL. Sci. Q. 53 (1981); Edward F. Cox, Reinvigorating the FTC: The Nader Report and
the Rise of ConsumerAdvocacy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 899 (2005).
19
For instance, "The War on Poverty" introduced by Lyndon B. Johnson during his State of
the Union address (Jan. 8, 1964), as well as proposed legislation that culminated in the Economic
Opportunity Act and the Establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity.
20
See, e.g., The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963); Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 1, 78 Stat. 508 (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
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judicial developments. 2' These were also the years in which American democracy was further consolidated through progressive reform of the common law, in
general, and torts, in particular. 22 It was not merely a coincidence that progressive tort reform tracked the coming of age of American democracy. It was
made possible by the democratic gains of the 1960s and 1970s and helped consolidate and protect those gains.
Since the 1980s, those democratic gains have been eroding. As Keyssar
states: "Although the formal right to vote is now nearly universal, few observers would characterize the United States as a vibrant democracy. ,23 In 2004, the
American Political Science Association warned that American democracy was
in peril. They carried out this warning with the press release quoted at the beginning of this Article 24 and through a set of reports commissioned by the Association. 25 Those reports located the cause of this demise in the widening gap
between the rich and poor. As its authors stated, "progress toward realizing
[the] American ideals of democracy may have stalled, and in some arenas re26
versed[,]" due to the broadening gap in income and wealth in America.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title II, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (1964); Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
86-778, Title VII, § 701(a)-(e), 74 Stat. 992, 993 (1965); and The Age Discrimination Act of 1967
(ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Stat. 602 (1967). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title
VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253. The EEOC obtained enforcement authority under the Equal Opportunity
Act of 1972; Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title IX, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) (Education Amendments prohibit
sex discrimination in all aspects of education programs that receive federal money); The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
21 For a list of landmark cases, see, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the
Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK.
L. REV. I app. 1 (2002).
22
See infra Part V.B. Although torts still reflected social inequalities, the reforms during the
1960s provided easier access to courts and better protection for consumers. As George Priest
notes, "since 1960, our modem civil liability regime has experienced a conceptual revolution that
is among the most dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system." George L.
Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability:A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundations of
Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). Constitutional torts also emerged during this
period, with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,403 U.S. 388 (1971).
23
KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 4, 322. For the view that our democracy is crumbling based on
current obstacles to voting, see SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF
VOTER SUPPRESSION (2006).
24
Press Release, supra note 1.
25
The task force compiled a series of reports in 2004: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY INAN AGE OF
RISING INEQUALITY; THREE CRITICAL ANALYSES ON ECONOMIC, GENDER, RACIAL, AND ETHNIC
INEQUALITIES IN AMERICAN POLITICs; and a set of teaching materials. The American Political

Task
Force
on
Inequality
and
American
Democracy,
Science
Association,
http://www.apsanet.org/section-256.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). These materials were edited
into a book. INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO
LEARN (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005).
26

TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY, AM. POL. Sci. ASS'N, AMERICAN

DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY
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Arguably, the U.S. has had a number of constitutional revolutions since
27
its founding. Few, if any, would argue that these revolutions, past or present,
have been as fundamental as the many democratic revolutions that took place
around the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 28 Even fewer would consider the U.S. to be in the throes of a revolution or in the recent aftermath of
such a revolution. 29 Yet, a number of commentators have characterized the
culmination of changes brought about by the Rehnquist Court over the last two
decades in these very terms. 30 Andrew Siegel recently noted that those commentating on the history of the Rehnquist Court are nearly uniform in their view
that "Chief Justice Rehnquist and his allies on the Court instigated a judicial
'revolution' that has fundamentally altered both the substance of American law
and the 31
institutional arrangements through which we develop and enforce legal
norms."
Properly speaking, these changes have been reactionary or counterrevolutionary and are routinely described in undemocratic terms. For instance,
taskforcereport.pdf. This is not to say that healthy levels of economic inequality are antithetical to
democracy. As is argued below in section II however, certain levels and certain forms of economic inequality become problematic from the standpoint of democracy when they undermine
either fair equality of opportunity or our civil and political liberties.
27
According to Ackerman, the U.S. has gone through three historical ruptures or transitions
brought about by heightened democratic participation resulting in "higher law making:" the extra
legal Founding which did not follow the procedures set out in the articles of Confederation, the
13th and 14th Reconstruction amendments which bypassed the proper Article V procedures and
the New Deal amendments, which took place largely through the pressure brought to bear on the
courts to switch in time in order to save the nine Supreme Court justices from having to share the
bench with a few more judges. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42-44 (1991).
Unlike these constitutional moments, the current revolution is not a democratic moment of higher
law making.
28
See Rtrri G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 206-09 (2002) (arguing that our founding revolution was conservative compared to many of the legal transitions that took place around the
world in the 1990s).
29
Perhaps the U.S. is now in a phase of consolidation. As Andrew Siegel puts it, "In rough
cut, one might suggest that the years prior to 1994 represent rehearsal and experimentation with
the agenda for the Rehnquist Revolution, the period from 1994 until 2002 or 2003, the years of the
Revolution, and the years since then a period of consolidation or retrenchment." Andrew M.
Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the
Rehnquist Court'sJurisprudence,84 TEx. L. REV. 1097, 1112 (2006).
30
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1045 (2001). See also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., THE REHNQUIST REVOLUTION IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, IN THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 55 (2002);
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword:We The Court, 115 HARv. L. REV.
4, 130 (2001); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CN. L. REV. 367, 370 (2002) (critiquing the "federalism revolution"). Cf. Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court,
78 IND. L. J. 47, 49-52 (2003) (taking a "modest" view of the Court's rulings); Dawn E. Johnsen,
Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on CongressionalPower: Presidential Influences on
ConstitutionalChange, 78 IND. L. J. 363, 364 (2003) (remaining agnostic about the "revolution").
31
Siegel, supra note 29, at 1100.
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Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson place the Court's contraction of congressional
power at the core of this "constitutional revolution. 32 Or, as Larry Kramer puts
it:
The defining characteristic of [the Rehnquist Court] is ... the
Justices' conviction that they and they alone are responsible for
[A]ny notion that what the Constitution
the Constitution ....
does or permits might best be left for the people to resolve using
the ordinary devices available to express their will seems beyond the Rehnquist Court's compass. 33
The counter-revolution is undemocratic, both because of the usurpation
of the power of Congress and of the people and because of the erosion of
mechanisms developed over time to hold government accountable and to keep
democracy on track. According to Sylvia Law, the Supreme Court has limited
Congress's ability to address national problems to a degree only matched by the
Lochner Court's interference with attempts by Congress and the President to
respond to the Great Depression.34 This includes: restricting the constitutional
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment; expanding state immunity from federally
defined claims of unfair labor practices and discrimination; and "reject[ing]
settled interpretations of federal civil rights laws to limit the protection that
Congress has sought to give to the civil and economic rights of many vulnerable
people, including older people, people with disabilities, women, and working
people. 35
It may come as little surprise that this counter-revolution tracks the decline in American democracy. It may come as more of a surprise that both of
these changes track the onslaught of regressive tort reform in the U.S. 36 Part V
addresses the supporting role the Supreme Court has played in the regressive
tort reform movement. This is not to say that the Supreme Court has played a
leading role in this movement, but the mere fact that the Supreme Court is involved at all is notable. It is testament to the reality that the present counterdemocratic changes taking place are not merely economic, political, or limited
to broad public law areas like federalism. Rather, these changes are pervasive,
cutting across the public and private law domains.
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 30, at 1045 (noting the revolution and criticizing the bare
majority of the Court which has systematically reappraised the doctrines of federalism, racial
equality, and civil rights, and who also gave the presidency to George W. Bush).
33
Kramer, supra note 30, at 158.
34
Law, supra note 30, at 371.
32

35

Id. at 371-72.

As Goldberg points out, arguing that that private law is integrally connected to public law
36
runs against the grain of academic wisdom. Goldberg, supra note 15, at 530.
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There is very little written in the legal academic literature connecting
38
37
tort reform to constitutional change, much less democratic change, although
some have been arguing for years that tort law reflects and further entrenches
the inequalities that exist in the U.S., 39 and numerous writers have noted that the
recent wave of tort "reform" has been a product of powerful corporate interest
groups and a campaign of disinformation. 4° If these commentators are correct,
But see JoEllen Lind, "ProceduralSwift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and
Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REv. 717, 719 (2004) (arguing that federal legislation moving
class actions into federal courts poses risks to the role of states in promoting the democratic values
of political participation, transparency, and accountability); Richard L. Abel, Questioning the
Counter-MajoritarianThesis: The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 533, 556 (1999) (arguing
that in the arena of tort reform "that courts tend to be populist and deliberative, whereas legislatures tend to be captured by special interests, secretive, hasty, and unwilling or unable to offer
reasons for their actions"); Goldberg, supra note 15 (arguing for a Constitutional Right to an
adequate legal scheme for the redress of wrongs); George L. Priest, The Constitutionalityof State
Tort Reform Legislation and Lochner, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 683, 683 (2001).
There are many articles written on the subject of constitutional torts. See, e.g., Thomas A. Eaton,
Symposium: Re-examining First Principles: Deterrence and Corrective Justice in Constitutional
Torts, 35 GA. L. REv. 837 (2001). For the relationship between state constitutions and tort law,
see John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort Law, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 1159 (2005).
38 Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig come very close to linking democracy and tort
reform when they label the period from 1945 to 1980 "the Democratic Expansionary Era." Rustad
& Koenig, supra note 21, at 4. Although the facts perhaps speak for themselves, Rustad and
Koenig do not explain why the period from 1945 to 1980 is an era of democratic expansion and
they do not argue that the current era is a period of democratic contraction. Nockleby & Curreri
note that the first wave of tort neo-liberal tort reform began in the 1970s. Nockleby & Curreri,
supra note 1, at 1030-31. Jay Feinman also comes close to connecting the "un-making" of the
common law to democratic decay. FEINMAN, supra note 9. While Feinman places the blame on
"radical conservatives," "the right" and/or "Republicans," the problem of unresponsiveness cuts
across party lines. For examples of regressive legislation (including tort reform) and policies
during the Clinton presidency, see infra notes 68, 78, and 218.
39
The most prominent example is Richard L. Abel. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort
Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (1987); Richard Abel, A Critique of American Tort
Law, 8 BRIT.J.L. & Soc'Y 199-231 (1981) Reprinted in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan Hutchinson ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 1989); Richard Abel, General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian(But Otherwise a GreatIdea), 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 253
(2006) See also Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146
U. PA. L. REv. 463 (arguing that deep biases in tort law result in higher damage awards for white
men than for women and minorities).
40
See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of PunitiveDamages' Iron Cage, 38 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 1297, 1300 (2005) ('The story of the punitive damages recoil is a familiar one about special
legislation to help corporate America."). Rustad also points to Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the
Report of the Governor's Commission on Tort and Liability InsuranceReform, 53 TENN. L. REV.
679, 680 (1986) (punitive damages reform is about special legislation for corporate America) and
John W. Wade, Strict Products Liability: A Look at its Evolution, THE BRIEF, 1989, at 8, 56 (tort
reform should be unconstitutional because it is special interest legislation). See also Siegel, supra
note 29, at 1147 (noting the substantial energies and resources spent by American businesses in
their fight for constitutional protection against punitive damages). See also Abel, supra note 37;
FEINMAN, supra note 9. For the view that the tort reform campaign is based on misinformation,
see F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform " Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L.
37
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that the success of the regressive tort reform movement can be credited to political influence, power lobbying and "a campaign of misinformation [that] convinces people that reducing their rights is actually in their own interest," 4 1 then
there is little room for question that the process behind this wave of tort reform
is undemocratic. As the argument in Parts III and IV shows, regressive tort reform is a predictable outcome of the state of American democracy, even without
the "campaign of misinformation." Nonetheless, this campaign of misinformation further erodes the democratic values of transparency and accountability,
making it harder for truly democratic reforms to gain traction. It further distorts
the already muted voices of the majority of Americans on this issue.
To argue that the democratic gains of the 1960s and 1970s have come
undone may sound slightly radical. 42 It may not jibe with the average law review reader's view of reality. The idea that the United States is "the model" of
democracy for the world is well entrenched in the American psyche. The fact
that the U.S. has a written Constitution that has been around the longest, often
leads to the incorrect assumption that this country was one of the first to establish democracy. 43 However, American democracy is very young, and the majority of Americans have neither a stake, nor a voice, in the political system.44
It is not expected that this proposition be taken on faith, and thus, the
remainder of this Article puts forth evidence detailing how large the gap is between the "haves" and the "have-nots" in the U.S. political and economic system, as well as how the rising inequality gap is bound up with losses in socioeconomic and political stake, political voice, and losses in political responsiveness and accountability. 45 The spiraling downward pressure of both socioREV. 437, 529-31 (2007) (describing the "tort reform" movement as using a political model of
truth rather than a rational model of truth, i.e. truth is about "truthiness" in the Stephen Colbert
sense of the term (see further infra section V)); Abel, supra note 37; FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 48,
190-92; and Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21. See also WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCANN,
DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004); THOMAS BAKER, THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005) (deconstructing the myths surrounding the calls for medical
malpractice reform). For misinformation concerning punitive damages, see Eisenberg, infra note
294. See also infra section V.
41
Id. at 19. See also Lind, supra note 37, at 719; Abel, supra note 37, at 556; Goldberg, supra
note 15; Priest, supra note 37, at 683; Eaton, supra note 37; Witt, supra note 37. See also infra
notes 178-182 and accompanying text for further discussion of this phenomenon.
42
The argument that follows does not depend on any "radical" or socialist view of the state or
democracy. The point is not "put down" the ailing "golden goose" out of envy because others
have more, but to nurture the goose back to life by reinvigorating the principles that sustain her.
43
Thirteen countries extended the franchise to women before the United States. Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia, http://ap.grolier.comarticle?assetid=02796700&templatename=/article/
article.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
44
It may be particularly difficult for law professors to imagine that they have little voice in
American politics (see infra Part III below on the impact of academics on political responsiveness).
45
In spite of the fact that surveys are biased against those with egalitarian views, Schlozman et
al.'s survey results revealed substantial pro-egalitarian sentiments. KAY L. SCHLOZMAN ET AL.,
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economic and political inequality has resulted in unresponsive legislation and
policies, including tort reform, that is contrary to the needs and interests of the
majority of Americans. Unlike the tort reform that helped consolidate American
democracy in the 1960s and 1970s, the tort reform of the last two decades has
acted to further entrench and consolidate oligarchy, if not plutocracy. This Article draws on contrasting trends in Europe to illustrate and support these points.
III.

A.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY: THE EROSION OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY'S
FOUNDATION
Introduction

Few, if any, in America or elsewhere are arguing for communist-style
economic equality. 46 There is little to no support for the view that, at the end of
the day, Americans should all have an equal income or equal wealth, no matter
how talented, hardworking or even lucky one may be.47 Nonetheless, economic
inequality becomes problematic from the standpoint of democracy, both when it
reaches a point where it seriously undermines political equality, and when it
undermines fair equality of opportunity in the market.
The principle of political equality is enshrined in John Rawls's first
principle of justice, which requires that "[e]ach person is to have an equal right
to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all. ' 48 As he states in his later work: "The fair
value of the political liberties ensures that citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an equal chance of influencing the government's policy and
of attaining positions of authority irrespective of their economic and social
TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY, INEQUALITIES OF POLITICAL VOICE 12-13 (2004),
http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/voicememo.pdf.
Those pro-egalitarian sentiments are much
stronger when it comes to the preferences of Americans for political equality than for economic
quality. Id. at 11, 17.
46
Ronald Dworkin makes this point in SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 2 (2000).
47
Ronald Dworkin would subject all choice-independent, luck-based economic inequality to
redistribution, including the luck of having or not having talent. Id. at 90-91, 287. Dworkin sees
this as following from the principle of equal resources, which, in turn, follows from his principle
that governments should show equal concern for the fate of each of its citizens. Id. at 1, 65-119.
For Dworkin, equal concern is the sovereign virtue of political community. Id. at 1.
48
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971). The point of Rawls's theory
of justice,
justice as fairness, is to provide a moral and philosophical basis for democratic institutions. JOHN
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 5 (2001). Rawls does believe that his two principles of justice can be realized under either a property owning democracy or a liberal socialist
regime, but not under a laissez-faire capitalist regime. Id. at 137-38. Ronald Dworkin shares this
view. Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism,in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984)
(arguing for a social democratic form of liberalism). For Dworkin, the demands of equality require either "redistributive capitalism or limited socialism-not in order to compromise the antagonistic ideal of efficiency and equality, but to achieve the best practical realization of the demands of equality itself." Id. at 69.
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class. 4 9 For Rawls, equal citizenship is incompatible with allowing any tradeoffs between economic inequality and one's liberties. 50 While his second principle of justice allows for economic inequality, 51 his first principle does not allow for political inequality. Americans tend to share this view, in that they
show overwhelming support for political equality 52 and are more comfortable
with economic inequality than political inequality.53
The goal, dream or myth of equal opportunity in a "land of opportunity," is a fundamental principle which undergirds our capitalist system. 4 The
idea is that people should have a fair, if not equal, chance of achieving more. It
is why movies like Rocky are so popular. People accept a certain level of economic inequality, based on the idea that those with less can have more, if they
have talent and if they put that talent to use in the market. Income or wealth
mobility based on fair equality of opportunity may even be counted as a fundamental principle of our capitalist democracy. This principle draws its appeal
both from an idea of fairness or just deserts, as well as from an idea of efficiency. In other words, both the idea of getting out of the economic system in
proportion to what one puts in, and the idea that there will be more for everyone,
supports the principle of fair equality of opportunity. The later notion is based
on the assumption that people will contribute more if their input into the system
results in fair output from the system.
It does not follow that the market provides fair equality of opportunity.
The capitalist market is not like a game of chess, an Olympic competition, or
even championship boxing where one wins a ribbon, gold medal or belt, and the
loser goes home to practice in the hopes of taking the ribbon, gold medal or belt
the next time. Left to its own, the market does not allow for comebacks on a
level playing field. It does not allow Ali, much less Rocky, to win the belt one
more time, just because he has the talent and energy to do it. It does not allow
this because the market does not merely dole out awards and prizes for those
who win; it doles out money and other tools for winning the next round of com49

50

RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, at 46.
John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory (the Dewey Lectures 1980): Rational

and Full Autonomy, 77 J. PHIL. 515,545 (1980). As Wolff points out, the priority of liberty articulates Rawls's conviction that mutual respect of equal citizenship expresses men's recognition of
one another's moral personality and that "to bargain away a portion of one's liberties for a softer
life would, in Rawls's view, be to sell one's birthright as a human being for a mess of potage."
ROBERT P. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF A THEORY OF

JUSTICE 88 (1977). This is one way of embodying in his theory the Kantian injunction to "treat
humanity, whether in oneself or others, always as an end and never merely as a means." Id.
51
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 302. Rawls's second principle of justice
requires that social and economic inequalities be arranged so that they are "attached to offices and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." Id. at 303.
52
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 11, 15.
53
Id. at 11, 17.
What John Rawls calls fair equality of opportunity. RAWLS, A
note 48, at 302-03.
54
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petition. It is more akin to each round of chess or checkers, where it becomes
harder and harder to win, the less pieces one has. It is like those games in which
the more points one scores, the more weapons and ammunition one can pick up,
thus making it easier to score. As disheartening as it is to lose round after round
to the bitter end, the game needs to end, and in order to entice one back to the
game, the playing field needs to be rebalanced. Few, if anyone, would be willing to start the checkers game or the boxing match where he or she left off,
much less where one's parents left off. People want a fair chance to win the
next game. If it is desirable for people to contribute, then inequalities produced
by the market should be harnessed and re-directed to make it worth participating
in the market. For instance, the fact that one's parents were relative losers cannot be allowed to doom one's children to being losers, and thus, certain levels of
health, education and general welfare are crucial for giving the "losers" what
they need to get back in the game, to give them what they need to contribute and
compete once again.
The remainder of this section details the extent of economic inequality
in America, as compared to other economically advanced democracies in terms
of income, wealth and mobility. It details both how unequal the U.S. is as a
result of the market and how little the U.S. government does to rebalance the
inequalities generated by the market. The impact of these economic equalities
on political equality is traced in Part IV below.
B.

Income inequality

For a short time, the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the people of New
Orleans brought American inequality into sharp relief. As one commentator
wrote, "Katrina's whirlwind has laid bare the fault lines of race and class in
America. For a lightning moment, the American psyche was singed., 55 There
appeared to be some hope that "the shock and shame" of Katrina might "strip
away the old evasions, hypocrisies and not-so-benign neglect" surrounding issues of inequality in America. 56 The overwhelming racial dimension to the impact of the hurricane no doubt further accentuated the contrast between the
"haves" and the majority of African-American "have-nots." These socioeconomic inequalities gave rise to fears of gross political inequality, as significant worries of disenfranchisement abounded in the lead up to the first city elec-

Johnathan Tilove, "Our Society is so Uneven": Katrina Exposes Inequalities of Race,
Wealth, TRENTON TMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at B 1.
56
Jonathan Alter, The Other America, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 42-48; Larry Bartels, Is
55

the Water Rising? Reflections on Inequality and American Democracy, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL.
39, 39 (2006) [hereinafter Bartels, Water Rising]. "Many Americans were shocked and shamed
by the televised images of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina ....
Thousands of
residents, mostly Black and poor, seemed to be trapped in a Hobbesian state of nature, abandoned
by government and civilized society."

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/7

14

Roederer: Democracy and Tort Law in America: The Counter-Revolution

2008]

DEMOCRA CY AND TORT LA W IN AMERICA

tions since the hurricane, given the
large numbers of poor African-Americans
57
that were resettled outside the city.
However inconvenient it might be, gross inequality is not limited to
New Orleans and other areas of drastic natural disasters. Inequality is pervasive
in this country. As Appendix Table 1 illustrates, the statistics on inequality
show that among rich western nations, the U.S. has the highest level of inequality by far.58 The U.S. has the largest gap between the bottom 10% of the population and the top 10% of the population as their income relates to the median
income (the decile ratio gap). 59 The U.S. also has the greatest degree of inequality when measured against all income distributions (the Gini coefficient gap),66 °1
and the lowest 10% is significantly worse off than their European counterparts.
Since WWII, this gap has widened62at a pace and to a degree unmatched by other
economically advanced countries.
Converting these numbers to a standard grade curve, such as the bell or
C curve commonly used in first year undergraduate courses, might bring them
into perspective. For the U.S., both the decile ratio of 5.38 and its Gini coefficient of .369 are over 2 standard deviations away from the average. This puts
both scores in the F range of a C curve. While the next worst group of performing countries (i.e. Spain, Ireland, the U.K. and Italy) is in the C- to D- range, the
U.S. is alone in the F range of the curve.

57

See,

e.g.,

Marc

Morano, Voter Disenfranchisement Predicted in New Orleans,
CNSNEws.coM, Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPolitics.asp?Page=%5CPolitics%5
Carchive%5C200603%5CPOL20060309a.html; Jesse Jackson, Secret rolls undermine N. Orleans
vote, CH1. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/

mi.qn4155/is 20060307/ai_n 16177797.
58
Andrea Brandolini & Timothy M. Smeeding, Patterns of Economic Inequality in Western
Democracies: Some Facts on Level and Trends, 39 PS: POL. SCL & POL. 21, 23 (2006); See also
id. at 22 fig. 1.
59
Id. The population in the bottom 10% income group receives only 39% of the median income, while the top 10% receive 210% of the median income. This results in a decile ratio in
which the top 10% income group receives 5.45 times what the bottom group receives.
60
Id. at 22 (0 being perfectly equal and a 1 or 100% being perfectly unequal). The U.S. CIA
Fact Book put the U.S. at 45% for 2004 with a 2004 estimate of 12% of the population below the
poverty line.

CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/us.html#Econ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). To explain further, perfect equality
means everyone has the same income (0) while perfect inequality means that one person has everything and the rest have nothing (1).
61 Brandolini & Smeeding, supra note 58, at 22 fig.1, available at http://www.lisproject.org/
keyfigures.
62

Lawrence Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Restoring the Tradition of Rigor and Relevance to
PoliticalScience, 39 PS: POL. SC. & POL. 27 (2006) (referring to L. MISHEL ET. AL, THE STATE OF

WOR ING AMERICA (2005)). See also Brandolini & Smeedling, supra note 58, at 25 figs. 3 & 4.
Jacobs and Skocpol report that, as of 2003, the most affluent fifth of the population received
47.6% of family income while the top 5% received 21% of that income. Jacobs & Skocpol, eds.,
INEQUALrrY, supra note 25.
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Post redistributioninequality

Inequality in America is not merely due to market-based inequalities,
but also due to a lack of government intervention to mitigate the inequalities
generated by the market.63 As Appendix Table 2 shows, if one only looks at the
inequality produced by the market, the U.S. is not much worse than many of
these thirteen advanced capitalist states, and, in fact, Americans are more equal
than the United Kingdom and France. However, market interventions by way of
taxes and benefits significantly dampen the disparity between the rich and the
poor in most of these countries. These inequalities are reduced by 47% in
France and over 30% in the U.K., while the U.S. government only dampens
these inequalities by 22%. While the average reduction in inequality is over
30%, the reduction in the U.S. is about 20%.
Further, the data on Gini coefficient reduction through taxes and benefits does not include pensions or the public provision of education or health
care, even though the low or no cost provision of these benefits greatly reduces
inequalities in what one can afford to consume. 64 Because educational provisions in most states in the U.S. are still based on local property values, the distribution of this service entrenches and exacerbates the above inequalities within
the U.S. No other country finances education in this way. 65 There is also a significant gap in the provision of health care between the U.S. and the other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) countries,
which significantly exacerbates the disposable income gap. 6 6 This has a significant impact on those who are uninsured or under-insured.67 Between 1973 and
63

Lane Kenworthy & Jonas Pontusson, Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in

Affluent
Countries, 3
PERSPECTIVES
ON
POL.
449
(2005),
available at
http://www.u.arizona.edu/-lkenwor/pop2005.pdf. This data does not reflect government spending
on infrastructure, the military, or the civil and criminal justice system, which provide a disproportionate benefit to businesses and the wealthy.
64
Id. at 455.
65
Allan Odden & William H. Clune, School Finance Systems: Aging Structures in Need of
Renovation, 20 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 157, 168-69 (1998). For the intersection
of law, race and education, see Samuel R. Lucas Paret & Marcel Paret, Annual Reviews, 1 ANN.
REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 203 (2005), available at http://arjoumals.annualreviews.org/eprint/
znK7y9nbHQND7hyTuGfb/full/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115931?cookieSet=l.
For
facts on educational attainment by race, see KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION FACT SHEET: YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MEN INTHE UNrrED STATES (2006) [hereinafter KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, FACT SHEET], http://www.kff.org/minorityhealth
/upload/754l.pdf.
6
Although Americans spend twice as much for health care than most O.E.C.D. countries,
most of the burden is born by the private sector. While the average O.E.C.D. country public expenditure on health as a percentage of total spending on health has consistently been over 70%
(1980-2005), the United States has averaged between 40% and 45% from 1980 to 2005. See
OECD Health Data 2006-Frequently Requested Data: Data on Public Expenditure on Health
(2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/49/35529832.xls.
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2000, the income of the bottom 90% of U.S. tax payers fell by 7%, while the
income of the top 1% grew by 14%.68
D.

Wealth inequality

The bottom line of inequality is not so much how much income one has,
but how much wealth one has at the end of the day, in terms of all one's physical and financial assets minus one's liabilities. Unfortunately, the situation is
significantly worse if one looks at inequality in wealth, rather than merely inequality in income. The U.S. Gini coefficient based on wealth is a staggering
.801 .69 This is worse than the Gini value that would be generated in a tenperson group, consisting of two people worth $1 million each, while everyone
else's combined net worth was $8,000 ($1,000 each). 70 The curve here is compressed compared to the income inequality curve. There are no As and there are
no Fs, but the U.S. does sit alone with Switzerland in the solid D range.
E.

Lack of mobility

At this point in time in America, about 50% of the differences in wealth
in one's parents' generation show up in the present generation.7 1 Contrary to
67

For information on the uninsured, see

KAISER

FAMILY FOUNDATION,

THE GROWING

[hereinafter KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, GROWING], http://www.kff.org/uninsured/profile.cfm. For statistics on provision of
UNINSURED

POPULATION AND THE HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET

health care by race, see KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, FACT SHEET, supra note 65.

Insurance

coverage may have a significant impact on law suits. As Reisman states, "where consumers are
heavily insured but manufacturers and sellers go bare, there will be fewer product liability actions
than in a jurisdiction where victims have little coverage but businesses hold large policies."
Mathias Reimann, Liabilityfor Defective Productsat the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century:
Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?,51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 827 (2003). See also Jane Stapleton, Products Liability in the United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 TEx. INT'L L.J. 45, 47
(1999) ("the [British] National Health Service has in the past operated to relieve most tortfeasors
from the costs of their victims' medical treatment.").
68
Heather Boushey & Christian E. Weller, Inequality and Household Economic Hardship 5
(United Nations Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. 18, April 2006).
69

JAMES B. DAVIES ET AL., THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH 26 (2006),

http://www.wider.unu.edulresearch/2006-2007/2006-2007-1/wider-wdhw-launch-5- 12-2006/
wider-wdhw-report-5-12-2006.pdf.
The wealth data here is household wealth as of the year 2000. As the authors of this report note,
"[w]ealth data typically become available with a significant lag, and wealth surveys are conducted
at intervals of three or more years. The year 2000 provides us with a reasonably recent date and
good data availability." Id. at 3 n.4.
70
The actual Gini coefficient generated by these numbers is .796. The same result would be
generated by two members of the group having $1,000 in wealth and eight having only $1. For an
accessible Gini calculator online see Free Statistics Software, Office for Research Development
and Education, http://www.wessa.net/co.wasp (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
71
Emily Belier & Michael Hout, IntergenerationalSocial Mobility: The United States in
Comparative Perspective 16 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 19, 26-27 (2006) (This entire issue, pub-
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what the majority of Americans believe, their chances of moving up the eco72
nomic ladder are not as good as they were 30 years ago. For instance, sons in
the bottom three-fourths of the socio-economic scale in the 1990s had a lower
chance of moving up than sons in the 1960s.73 Even more troubling is that
household income inequality increased, while those working within the household also increased. 74 Without the contribution of wives, the income of the bottom fifth would have decreased by 13.9% between 1979 and 2000, rather than
rising by 7.5%.75 Although the U.S. has achieved an average performance in
occupational mobility, as compared to other "open" societies or countries that
espouse the idea of equality of opportunity, it performs rather poorly when it
comes to actual income mobility.7 The United States has high income inequality, coupled with low income mobility, whereas the Scandinavians have high
income mobility and low income inequality. 77 If American democracy is measured, in part, by the principle of fair equality of opportunity or by how well it
approximates the ideal embodied in the title, "the land of opportunity," it is falling well below the mark.

lished by The Brookings Institute and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton, is dedicated to Opportunity in America (1-196)). The figure is 40% for intergenerational income inequality. Id. at 25-26.
72
See e.g., Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Class Matters: Shadowy Lines that Still Divide,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, http://www.nytimes.corn2005/05/15/national/class/OVERVIEWFINAL.html?ex=1273809600&en=2fb75 6e388191419&ei=5088&partner=-rssnyt&emc=rss. The
New York Times poll indicated that over 75% of Americans thought that the chances of moving
up the economic ladder were as good or better than they were 30 years ago. Interactive Graphic,
How
Class
Works,
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/national/20050515_CLASS_
GRAPHIC/index_01 .html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
73
Boushey & Weller, supra note 68, at 6 (citing Earl Wysong, Robert Perrucci, & David
Wright, Organizations,Resources, and Class Analysis: The DistributionalModel and the U.S.
Class Structure (Ind. U., Working Paper, 2004) (comparing the incomes and occupations of 2,749
fathers and sons from the 1970s to the late 1990s)). See also Belier & Hout, supra note 71, at 19,
27.
74
Boushey & Weller, supra note 68, at 6.
75
Id. The top fifth of incomes was not as heavily impacted by women entering the job market
as was the bottom. Wives in families with children in the bottom fifth increased their working
hours by 43.9% as compared to only a 27.4% increase in working hours among wives in the top
fifth. Id.
76
Beller & Hout, supra note 71, at 30.
77
Id. Note that this is likely a result of how poorly the children in the United States fare in
comparison with other rich countries. The U.S. ranks 20 out of 21 countries when it comes to the
well-being of its children (with only the U.K. performing worse in this regard). INNOCENTI
RESEARCH CENTRE, UNICEF, CHILD POVERTY IN PERSPECTIVE: AN OVERVIEW OF CHILD WELLBEING IN RICH COuNTRIEs 2 (2007), available at http://www.unicef-icdc.org/publications/ (this

ranking is a combined ranking based on: material well-being, family and peer relationships, health
and safety, behavior risks, and both educational well-being and subjective well-being). The four
Scandinavian countries are in the top 7 of this ranking, i.e. Sweden is at number 2, Denmark at 3,
Finland at 4, and Norway at 7. Id. See also Table 5 infra p. 709.
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IV. POLITICAL INEQUALITY: UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY AND FURTHER
ENTRENCHING ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

As early as 1955, Simon Kuznets described the relationship between
inequality and economic development in democratic terms. In Economic
Growth and Income Inequality, he stated:
[I]n democratic societies the growing political power of the urban lower-income groups led to a variety of protective and supporting legislation, much of it aimed to counteract the worst effects of rapid industrialization and urbanization and to support
the claims of the broad masses for more adequate shares of the
growing income of the country.78
However, in recent years, lower-income groups have failed to secure such "protective and supporting legislation," and the legislation that is on the books has
been scaled back and under-enforced, 79 leaving the poor and lower-income
groups to the vicissitudes of the market. For instance, Bill Clinton's Welfare
Reform of 1996 removed many important features of the U.S. welfare safety
net.8 ° If Kuznets is correct, something has gone wrong with American democracy, or at least with the ability of lower-income
groups to use political pressure
81
to have their needs addressed in the U.S.
The impact of the gap between the "haves" and "have-nots" on democracy is explored in detail in the American Political Science Association Task
Force Reports on Inequality and American Democracy. 82 In describing the results of the report, two of its authors stated:
[The report concluded that the] privileged participate more than
others and are increasingly well organized to press their de78

Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45

AM. ECON. REV.

1, 17 (1955).

One example that resonates with tort reform is the E.E.O.C. See, e.g., Marni Goldberg, JobDiscriminationClaims Pile Up With Budget Cuts, CHu. TRIBUNE, June 17, 2006 (The claims backlog at the EEOC, which has lost 20% of its staff since 2001, grew 12% last year, resulting in a
backlog of over 33,000 claims; the backlog is expected to grow to 48,000 by 2007 while Bush is
proposing another 4 million dollar reduction in funding).
80
See JACOB HACKER ET AL., TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY,
79

14 (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/feedbackmemo.pdf.
As Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez note in Income Inequality in the United States, 19131998, CXVIII THE Q. J. OF ECON. 1, 1-2 (2003), "the Kuznets curve is widely held to have doubled back on itself, especially in the United States, with the period of falling inequality observed
during the first half of the twentieth century being succeeded by a very sharp reversal of the trend
since the 1970s."
81
Or, the U.S. is in a new industrial revolution (i.e. the computer revolution). See Piketty &
Saez, supra note 80, at 2, 24.
82
TASK FORCE REPORTS, supra note 25.
INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
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mands on government. Public officials, in turn, are much more
responsive to the privileged than to average citizens and the
least affluent. Citizens with lower or moderate incomes speak
with a whisper that is lost on the ears of inattentive government
officials, while the advantaged roar with a clarity and consis83
tency that policy-makers readily hear and routinely follow.
This undermines the principle of political equality, or what Rawls calls the fair
value of the political liberties (see above), by allowing socio-economic disadvantage to translate into political disadvantage and the erosion of the fair value
of one's political liberties.
According to some studies, the poorest one-third of Americans have virtually no influence on national legislation and the bottom two-thirds have less
than half the influence of the top one-third. 84 Larry Bartels, another member of
the Task Force, summarized his unpublished findings from the 101st Congress
of 1989 to the 103rd Congress of 1994, which showed that, while there was a
good deal of responsiveness to middle- and high-income constituents, senators
completely ignored constituents in the bottom third economic bracket.85 The
figures are stark, with nearly twice as much responsiveness shown to highincome constituents than for middle-income constituents and absolutely no
weight given to the lower one-third of the population.86 One may have expected
that this would hold true for Republican members of Congress, given the stereotype that Republicans are for the rich, while Democrats are for the poor.87
Bartels's statistics do, in fact, show that Republicans are nearly twice as responsive to the views of wealthy constituents as Democrats. 88 While one might expect that Democrats would spread their responsiveness between middle- and
lower-income constituents, they, in fact, split their responsiveness nearly 50/50
83

Jacobs & Skocpol, INEQUALiTY, supra note 25, at 27. See also Kay Lehman Schlozman, On

Inequality and Political Voice: Response to Stephen Earl Bennett's Critique, 39 PS: POL. ScI.
POL. 55, 56 (2006) (referring to SCHLOZMAN ET. AL., supra note 45, at 30-33).

&

84
Bartels, Water Rising, supra note 56, at 40. See also Stephen Macedo & Christopher Karpowitz, The Local Roots of Inequality, 39 PS: POL. SC. AND POL. 59, 60 (2006); Larry M. Bartels,
Economic Inequality and PoliticalRepresentation (2005) [hereinafter Bartels, Economic] (unpublished manuscript, on file with Princeton University), www.princeton.edu/-bartels/economic.pdf;
Martin Gilens, Public Opinion and Democratic Responsiveness: Who Gets What they Want from
Government? (2003) [hereinafter Gilens, Public Opinion] (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Princeton University), http://www.princeton.edu/-csdp/cvents/pdfs/Gilens.pdf; Martin Gilens,
discussing Public Opinion and Democratic Responsiveness: Who Gets What they Want from
Government?, The Center for Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton University, conference on
Global Inequality (Nov. 7-8, 2003).
85
Bartels, Water Rising, supra note 56, at 40.
86
See id. at 40 fig. 1.
87
Although there is some truth to the former assertion, Bartels's work shows that there is little
truth to the latter assertion.
88
Bartels, Economic, supra note 84, at 20-24, 44-46 tbls.4-6, 53 fig.3.
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between middle- and high-income constituents and, like Republicans, are completely unresponsive to low-income constituents. 89 This view is supported by
historians of voting law and practices and by former democratic cabinet members.90 As Alexander Keyssar noted in his work on the history of voting in
America, Democrats have spent more energy courting suburban swing votes and
trying to keep Wall Street happy than trying to mobilize the masses of poor nonvoters. 9'
Bartels also noted that the unpublished work of Martin Gilens supported
his finding.9 z Gilens has since published his expanded research, and the results
are even more startling than Bartels's findings.93 Although he found a moderately strong relationship between what the public wants and what the government does, 94 he also found that, when Americans with different income levels
had differing policy preferences, the policy outcomes strongly reflected the preferences of the most affluent but not those of poor or even middle-income
Americans. 95 Thus, Gilens's published work goes beyond questioning whether
the democratic system works for the poor, to whether the system can be characterized as democratic at all.
Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page found similar results when it came
to U.S. foreign relations. 96 These authors tested the impact of four different
factors on U.S. foreign policy: 1) public opinion, 2) labor, 3) business, and 4)
members of epistemic communities (hereinafter experts). 97 The last factor consists of experts such as educators, leaders of private foreign policy organizations
and think tanks. They used four different types of regression models and found
that, under the four models, business was by far the most dominant influence on
U.S. foreign policy (across the House, the Senate and the executive administra89

The actual ratio is 54/46, thus, Democrats can boast that they are moderately more the party

of the middle class than of the upper class. Bartels, Economic, supra note 84, at 53 fig.3.
90
KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 4, 321. Keyssar also refers to the work of Robert Reich, Clinton's secretary of labor (ROBERT B. REICH, LOCKED IN THE CABINET (1997)) noting that Reich's
memoirs have a number of references to the fact that the Clinton administration's political strategies subordinated social policy to the preferences of Wall Street.
91

Id.

92

Bartels, Water Rising, supra note 56, at 40 (referring to Gilens, Public Opinion, supra note

84).
93
Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 778, 778-96
(2005) [hereinafter Gilens, Inequality]. He has almost doubled his data set from 754 to 2000
questions and expanded the years from 1992 to 1998 to between 1981 and 2002. Id. Note that
these years substantially overlap with the Rehnquist Court and with the beginning of regressive
tort reform.
94
Id. at 786. Gilens notes, however, that even with proposed changes receiving 90% public
support there is only a 46% chance the policy makers will adopt the policy. Id.
95
See id. at 788-89.
96
Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 107 (2005).
97

Id.

at I110.
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tion).98 Public opinion had virtually no impact,99 and the impact of experts was
dubious. 1' ° It was unclear whether their opinions were causes or effects of the
views of policy makers, 10 1 and how much of their views were the result of the
influence of business and labor. 102 If the impact of business and labor on expert
opinions is plugged into their analysis, then the impact of business on foreign
policy raises from .52 to just over .70, while the impact of labor rises from .16
to about .29.103 While labor has some impact, it is still dwarfed by the impact of
business.
The results of this study bring into doubt the democratic responsiveness
and accountability of the U.S. political system. °4 If public opinion has little to
no influence on foreign policy, the real impact of experts is dubious, and business has two to three times the impact of labor, then one must question the true
vitality of American democracy. Given the standards articulated above, these
signs of non-responsiveness and grossly unequal responsiveness threaten democracy conceived in these terms. 0 5
Of course, it is difficult to be heard if one does not have a voice. Political voice is exercised through voting, spending or contributing, and actual contact with politicians. Social scientists have identified voter turnout as the potential cause of both the failure to alleviate the inequality gap'06 and the failure to
respond to lower-income constituents.' 7 Others have argued that affluence and
actual contact with politicians, or the lack thereof, may be more significant
in
10 8
determining the responsiveness of politicians to different constituencies.
According to political economists, Kenworthy and Pontusson, the median-voter model predicts that, with increases in market inequality, the distance
between median and mean income increases (the mean or average wage goes up
more than the wage in the middle, or median wage); as a result, support for gov98

Id. at 114-17.

99

Id. at 114 tbl. 1, 115 tbl.2, 116 tbls.3-4.
Id.
Id. at 117.

100
101
102
103

Id. at 119.
Id.; see id. at 120 tbl.5. For a treatment of this phenomenon in the context of tort reform,

see FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 175.
104
Jacobs & Page, supra note 95. The authors note that their findings "have some troubling
normative implications." These normative implications apply to "adherents to democratic theory
who advocate substantial government responsiveness to the reasoned preferences of citizens." Id.
at 121 (referring to such adherents as ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) and
BENJAMIN PAGE & ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIwrY YEARS OF TRENDS IN
AMERICA'S POuCY PREFERENCES (1992)).
105 Bartels, Water Rising, supra note 56, at 39.
106
Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 63, at 456-61, 459 (emphasis added), 462 fig.9. This is
the contemporary variant of Kuznets' work cited above. Kuznets, supra note 78.
107
John Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented, 67 J. POL. 1206 (2005).
101
Bartels, Economic, supra note 84, at 26-27.
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emnment spending increases, and thus, the inequality gap is narrowed.' °9 As
documented above, while the model works in Europe, it has failed in the United
States. How does one account for the failure? One viable explanation for
Europe's success, and the United State's failure to close the gap, is voter turnout. In the countries surveyed by Kenworthy and Pontusson, the differences in
responsiveness to inequalities roughly track voter turnout rates."' In other
words, the higher the voter turnout, the more redistribution from rich to poor."'
A.

Voter turnout: the most egalitarianform of politicalparticipation

The average voter turnout for elections in the 16 countries in the Appendix Table 4 is about 76%. 112 Although the 2004 U.S. national elections
showed a somewhat respectable turnout of almost 60%, the turnout for the 2006
national mid-term elections was 41.4%.113 The average turnout for U.S. congressional elections from 1945 to 2001 was 48%, which is quite low, compared
to the average of 76% in 16 other countries. The turnout at local elections tends
to hover at about 30% and below. 1 4 Michael P. McDonald collected statistics
from state elections from 1980-2006. His research documents voter participation rates between 35.3% and 55.3% using the VAP model and 38.1% and
60.3% using the VEP model and documents that voter turnout in the 2006 state
elections averaged 37% VAP and 40.4% VEP. 1 5 Even if state officials are re109 Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 63, at 456 (referring to Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard,
A RationalTheory of the Size of Government, 89 J. POL. ECON. 914 (1981)).
110
Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 63, at 459, 462 fig.9.
III
Compare table 2, infra at 71-72 with table 3, infra at 72. The explanation is strengthened in
the U.S. case by the data presented below, which shows that the poor have much lower voter
turnout rates than those in the middle class and above.
112 Derived from statistics of averages of voting age population ratios across 169 countries in
parliamentary elections from 1945-2001 compiled by the International Institute for Democratic
and Electoral Assistance.

RAFAEL L6PEZ PuITOR ET AL., VOTER TURNOUT RATES FROM A

COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
75,
83-84
(2002),
http://www.idea.int/publications
/vt/uploadlVoter%20turnout.pdf. Note that not only is the U.S. significantly below every other
country on this list, it ranks 138th out of the 169 countries in the survey. Id.
113
The U.S. census report for 2004 uses VEP which excludes those people of voting age who
are not eligible to vote like certain immigrants and felons/ex felons. KELLY HOLDER, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,

VOTING

AND

REGISTRATION

IN

THE

NOVEMBER

2004

ELECTION:

POPULATION

CHARACTERISTICS 1 (2006), http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf. The statistics for
the 2006 election turnout came from Non-Profit Voter Engagement Network and they also use
VEP. America Goes to the Polls: A Report on Voter Turnout in the 2006 Election, available at
http://www.nonprofitvote.org/wp-content/uploads/AGttP.pdf. Note that mid-term elections are
generally much lower. Id.
114
Macedo & Karpowitz, supra note 84, at 59-60 (referring to STEPHEN MACEDO Er. AL.,
DEMOCRACY AT RISK: How POLITICAL CHOICES UNDERMINE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND WHAT

WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 66 (2005) and Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Where Turnout Matters:
The Consequencesof Uneven turnout in City Politics,67 J. POL. 515 (2005), as well as others).
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sponsive to voters, these numbers call into question the democratic pedigree of
state legislative tort reform.
Writing prior to the 2000 elections, Alexander Keyssar noted that
historically, low voter turnout correlated with class and education and that "the
people who are least likely to be content and complacent (and most likely to
need government help) are those who are least likely to vote."' 1 6 This debunks
the idea that Americans do not vote because they are generally content. He goes
on to state that low voter turnout persists among the same groups to whom the
franchise was limited throughout much of American history, namely, the poor,
the young,
17 certain minorities and those with less education (i.e. the "have-

nots").1

These observations were borne out in the 2004 elections. Those in the
over $50,000 income bracket had a 77% voter turnout, as opposed to those
making less than $20,000, which had a 48% voter turnout.' 18 The poor were
greatly overrepresented among non-voters, while those making over $100,000 a
year were greatly underrepresented among non-voters. 1' 9 The employed had a
66% turnout, as opposed to a 50% turnout for the unemployed. 120 Those with
bachelor's degrees had about twice the voter turnout than those without high
school degrees (78% versus 40%).121 The 18-24 year old bracket without a high
school degree had a rate of fewer than 25%, while the same age bracket with
college degrees had a 67% rate. 122 Non-Hispanic white citizens had turnout
rates at 67%, while African-American citizens were at 60%, Hispanic citizens at
47% and Asian citizens at 44%. 123 As one might predict, the increase in voter
turnout for the 2004 election was not due to a higher turnout rate of AfricanAmericans, Asian-Americans, Hispanic-Americans or the poor; instead, the
increase was from non-Hispanic whites, who increased their turnout from 60.5%

115

United

States

Election

Project,

Voter

Turnout

Statistics,

Turnout

1980-2006,

http://elections.gmu.edu/Tumout%201980-2006.xls (last visited July 24, 2007). VAP stands for
"voting age population" and includes everyone above the age of 18 while VEP stands for "voting
eligible population" which excludes undocumented immigrants non eligible felons and others not
eligible to vote. See also Michael P. McDonald, State Turnout Rates Among Those Eligible to
Vote, 1980-2000, 2 ST. POL. AND POL'Y Q. 199 (2002).
116
KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 320.
117 Id.at 321. The notable exception is women. HOLDER, supra note 113, at 2.
118
HOLDER, supra note 113, at 5. The income based statistics stop at $100,000 and over and so
it is difficult to know what the numbers are like for the very wealthy.
119 Id. at 10 Nb.C.
120

Id.at 5.

121

Id.

122

Id.at 6.
Id. at 7.

123
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in 2000 to 67% in 2004, and from those making over $50,000 per year, who
increased their turnout from 72% in 2000 to 77% in 2004.'24
As noted above, voter turnout has also been used to explain the closely
related phenomenon of a lack of responsiveness. Voting theorists, Griffin and
Newman, found that voters are better represented than non-voters. 125 Given that
the middle- and upper-income groups have better voter turnout rates than the
poor, this may account for at least some of the difference in responsiveness.
There is a whole host of explanations for why certain minorities, the
poor, and the uneducated have such low voter turnouts. Those explanations
include: lack of a stake in the system (little to gain), 126 the complex non-user128
friendly procedures, 127 conflicts with work, school or childcare obligations,
the fact that voting is not mandatory, 129 and the fact that the United States has30a
two party system, under which neither party caters to the interests of the poor.
Almost all of these factors have a disproportionate negative impact on
the poor and uneducated. If elected officials were concerned about the groups
that have such low voter turnout, a number of simple reforms would make it
easier to go to the polls. As common sense suggests, given that those who failed
to vote did not elect the representatives currently in office,3 those representatives
lack incentives to enact reforms to bring them to the polls.' '

124 Compare HOLDER, supra note 113 (reporting on the voter turnout for the 2004 elections)
with AMY JAMIESON ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF

NOVEMBER 2000: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 3, 5 (2002), http://www.census.
gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf.
125
Griffin & Newman, supra note 107.
126 Clinton's own secretary of labor said that "the great mass of non-voters ... didn't vote in
1996 because they saw nothing in it for them." REICH, supra note 90, at 330.
KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 321. See also MARTIN WATrENBERG, WHERE HAVE ALL THE
VOTERS GONE? 162 (2002). Wattenberg finds it impressive how good our turnout is, considering
how complicated our process is compared to other countries. Id.
128 This is because our elections are held during the work week and not on a public holiday.
See WATTENBERG, supra note 1277, at 169-71. Wattenberg notes that in President Clinton's last
official message to Congress he wrote: "We should declare election day a national holiday so that
no one has to choose between their responsibilities at work and their responsibilities as a citizen."
Id. at 170-71 (citing William Jefferson Clinton, 42nd President of the United States, The Unfinished Work of Building One America, Message to Congress (Jan. 15, 2001)).
129
In the 9 countries where compulsory voting is enforced, the turnout rate is over 85% compared to nearly 75% in the 10 countries that do not enforce their mandatory voting laws. PINTOR
Er AL., supra note 112. Compare this to the average of approximately 68% for the remaining 147
countries that do not have compulsory voting. Id. at 112.
130 KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 321. As he further notes, Clinton's own Secretary of Labor said
that "the great mass of non-voters ... didn't vote in 1996 because they saw nothing in it for them."
Id. See also REICH, supra note 90, at 330.
131
Here, the democratic process has very little hope of correcting itself.
127
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Setting aside the problems created by the two party system, 32 which
would be both practically and politically difficult to change, many other changes
would be simple, for instance: make ballots less complicated,1 33 make elections
1 36
3
mandatory, 134 make election day a national holiday, put it on a weekend,
simply extend the hours, 137 or allow for no-excuse absentee ballots.' 38 These
would significantly improve democratic participation.
B.

Other more stratifiedforms of politicalparticipation

Bartels tested the hypothesis that voter turnout was the cause of lack of
responsiveness, along with a few other contenders, e.g., "political knowledge"
and "contact with senators and/or staff," and found the latter to have the most
significant impact on responsiveness. 139 By comparing his work with Sidney
Verba's, he was also able to roughly test the hypothesis that campaign contributions impacted responsiveness, and he found that, in two of the eight areas, the
projected disparities in responsiveness matched the disparities in income contribution. 40 In the other areas, the disparities did not quite match the dollar for
dollar disparities
although, unsurprisingly, they did tend to fall in the same di41
rection. 1

132

See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND

PERFORMANCE IN THRTY-Six COUNTRIES (1999). See also Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Sys-

tems: Proportional,Majoritarianand Mixed Systems, 18 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 297 (1997).
133
Wattenberg notes that in Europe there are generally much fewer choices to make on ballots,
making them much easier to complete. WATTENBERG, supra note 127, at 166.
See PINTOR ET AL., supra note 112. See also WATTENBERG, supra note 127, at 164; Arend
Lijphart, Unequal Participation:Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SC. REV. 1
(1997). Note that compulsory voting laws do not require that one actually vote, but they do require that one show up to vote unless one has an appropriate excuse or justification for not doing
SO. WATTENBERG, supra note 127, at 164.
135 WATTENBERG, supra note 127, at 170-71.
136 Id. at 169.
137
Id. at 172 (drawing on the Japanese experience).
138
Most states require a reason in order for one to register and vote with an absentee ballot.
UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION ELECTION DAY SURVEY, Ch. 5, Absentee
Ballots, available at http:llwww.eac.gov/clearinghouse/2004-election-day-survey/?searchterm
=Chapter%205,%20Absentee%20Ballots. The Commission notes that in those 24 jurisdictions
with "no excuse" needed, the rate of requests was nearly four times as great as in those that required an excuse (20.1% vs. 5.1%). Id. at 10. This site also provides results for the number of
absentee ballots returned, the number counted, the number not counted, and the five most common reasons for rejecting absentee ballots. Id. at 3-6.
139
Bartels, Economic, supra note 84, at 24-29, 47 tbl.7.
140
Id. at 28-29 (using SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND INEQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN
AMERICAN POLmCS 194, 565 (1995)).
141
Id.
134
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Despite low voter turnout rates, voters are the most numerous and most
representative group of political activists. 142 At the other end of the representa43
tive spectrum are campaign contributors, who are the least representative.
Eighty-five percent of those making a donation to a presidential candidate of
over $1,000 had at least a bachelor's degree, and 95% of the substantial donors
to presidential candidates in 2000 made over $100,000.144 The race, sex and age
discrepancies in donations of over $200 to presidential candidates reflect similar
discrepancies, with 96% of donations coming from Caucasians, 70% coming
30.145
from males and over 99% of donations coming from those over age
Those in the 18-30 age bracket contributed only 1%, while those over age 46
contributed 83% of the total donations. 46
Looking across the spectrum of participation, the statistics show that
those making over $75,000 per year are between two and six times more likely
to participate in politics through campaign work, direct contact, protests, affiliation with political organizations, informal community activities, and campaign
contributions than those making under $75,000 per year. 147 Those with an income over $75,000 per year have approximately twice as much direct contact as
those making less than $75,000 per year. 148 The numbers are not as drastic for
race, but they do show significant disparities between Caucasians, AfricanAmericans and Latinos.149 The discrepancy in political activity between ages
18-24, as compared to ages 24-49 and 50-59, was about 1-2.150 Note that the
E.U. Council of Europe and the E.U. Ministers of Youth have expended considerable efforts to get youth below voting age to participate in politics, through
direct integrations into the political processes, youth organizations, action-

142

SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 22, 38.

143

Id. at 22.

144 Id. This group comprised only 12% of the population. Id.
145 Id. at 38 tbl.3.
146 Id.

147

Id. at 22 fig. I. Class based stratification affects the entire range of political activities.

KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 321-22 (referring to VERBA, ET AL., supra note 141, at 1-13, 23-24,

511-33). "The affluent and well-educated are not only able to afford the financial costs of organizational support but they are in a better position to command the skills, acquire the information,
and utilize the connections that are helpful in getting an organization off the ground or keeping it
going." SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 20.

148

Id. at 22 fig. 1.

149

Gilens, Inequality, supra note 93, at 24 tbl.2. See also id. at 24 fig.3. In terms of mean
number of political activities, Anglo-White men had 2.36 compared to 1.94 for Black men and
1.61 for Latino men. Among women, Whites had 2.08, Black's 1.86, and Latinas 0.9. Id
ISO

SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 25 fig.4. It shows 1.26 political acts performed by

those in the 18-24 age range compared with 2.17 in the 30-39 range, 2.54 in the 40-49 range, 2.52
in the 50-59 range, 2.35 for 60-69, with the numbers understandably dropping off for those over
70 to 1.82. id.
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oriented participation and through ombudsman representing the interests of
children.' 5 '
Education is a central element in the relationship between socioeconomic status and participation because it affects many other determinants of
socio-economic status. It also affects the other determinants of participation
(e.g., job, income, knowledge, civic and organizational skills), along with connections with other politically
active people, who are more likely to enlist their
152
activities.
political
in
aid
Given the growing inequality in America, the low voter turnout among
the poor and uneducated, the lack of access of middle- and lower-income
Americans to politicians, and the resulting lack of influence on "representatives," it is unsurprising that legislation in general, and tort reform in particular,
would not tend to the needs and preferences of a majority of Americans, but
would cater to the preferences of the few.
Disenfranchisedcitizens (IllegalAmericans)153

C.

Since 1975, incarceration rates in the United States have quadrupled,
and over 5.3 million felons and ex-felons are prohibited from voting. 154 Two
151
See, e.g., European Commission, Political Participation Starts at School, http://ec.
europa.eu/research/press/2006/pr2003en.cfn (last visited July 24, 2007). See also EUROPEAN
CENTER FOR SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF YOUTH:

REMEDY

AGAINST

MARGINALIZATION

AND

SOCIAL

EXCLUSION,

A

http://www.euro.centre.

org/detail.php?xml-id=393 (last visited July 24, 2007).
152 Gilens, Inequality, supra note 93, at 26. Access to selective colleges is highly skewed by
race and ethnicity, and even more skewed by socio-economic status. ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE &
STEPHEN J. ROSE, CENTURY FOUNDATION, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND
SELECTIVE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
10-11, 69 tbl.1.1 (2003), available at http://

www.tcf.org/Publications/Education/camevale rose.pdf. Carnevale and Rose found that "74
percent of the students at the top 146 highly selective colleges came from families in the top quarter of the SES scale (as measured by combining family income and the education and occupations
of the parents), just 3 percent came from the bottom SES quartile, and roughly 10 percent came
from the bottom half of the SES scale. If attendance at these institutions reflected the population
at large, 85,000 students (rather than 17,000) would have been from the bottom two SES quartiles." Id. at 11.
153
The term "illegal American" is used because it tracks the pejorative term "illegal immigrant." It is a way to mark them as "illegal" rather than as, say, hard-working, exploited immigrants. The label "illegal" is not generally used to categorize people when they break the law.
For instance, there is little talk about the "illegal employer" problem in America. Felony disenfranchisement, particular post-release, is a way of marking people as outlaws or second class
citizens.
154

JEFF MANZA

& CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND

77 (2006). Manza and Uggen put the number at 5.3 million with 39%
their sentences.
Id.
See also KATHERINE I. PErUS, FELONY

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

having completed

DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM, AND MODERN

CONSEQUENCES (2005). As of July 2006, there were 4.9 people incarcerated out of every 1,000,
which is almost one out of very 200 people. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited July 24, 2007). The
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and a half percent of the general population is denied the right to vote.1 55 The
demographics for the prison population significantly overlap with those in society who have low voter turnout and low political participation in general. Richard Freeman of Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research reports that the prison population is disproportionately black and young,
with low education and literacy levels. 156 Information on released prisoners
indicates that 14% have less than 8 years of schooling and 67% have less than a
high school education.157 Nearly half of the prison population consists of black
males, and 68% of all prisoners are below the age of 34158
Ex-offenders are not successful in the job market. They have low em159
ployment rates and tend to earn less than others with similar demographics.
Further, nearly one-third has a physical impairment or mental condition and
21% have some physical or mental condition that impairs work ability. 16 As
Freeman states, "[s]ince persons with physical and mental health problems, limited education, and poor literacy do badly in the US job market independently of
a criminal record, [it should come as no surprise that] ex-offenders fare poorly
in the job market."' 161 It should also come as little surPrise that, under these
conditions, most ex-prisoners end up returning to prison.
The felon/ex-felon demographic is a distinct, insular and growing minority in American society. Although they represent an extreme case, their disenfranchisement is compounded by the fact that they have
very little mobility,
163
very little stake, and even less say about society's future.
percentages for African American males at the end of 2005 was over 3%, compared to white
males at less than .5% of their population. Id.
155 LALEH ISPAHANI, ACLU, OUT OF STEP WITH THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT

IN

THE

U.S.

AND

OTHER

DEMOCRACIES

3

(2006),

http://www.

aclu.org/pdfs/votingrights/outofstep-20060525.pdf.
156

RICHARD FREEMAN, CAN WE CLOSE THE REVOLVING DOOR? RECIDIVISM VS. EMPLOYMENT

OF Ex-OFFENDERS INTHE U.S.A. (The Urban Inst. Reentry Roundtable Discussion Paper, 2003),
availableat http://www.ssw.unich.edu/events/CASD/freeman.pdf.
157
Id. at 7,17 tbl.3.
158
Id. at 15 tbl.1.
159 Id. at 9-10 (referring to Richard Freeman, Economics of Crime, in 3C THE HANDBOOK OF
LABOR ECONOMICS Ch. 52 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999)); and Bruce Western, The
Impact of Incarcerationon Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 526 (2002)).
160
161

162

Id. at 10, 11, 19 tbl.5.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 2 (citing PATRICK LANGAN & DAVID LEVIN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM

OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 1 (2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf)).
163
This is also true of the over 10 million unauthorized immigrants living in the United

States.

For the numbers

see JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS:
NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS 1 (2005), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf. Unauthor-

ized immigrants provide a cheap, hardworking and docile labor force. Their presence keeps authorized immigrants and U.S. citizens relatively docile while keeping their wages low. They also
provide a scapegoat for our woes and threats to our security, even though they put much more into
our economy than they take out (including social security and taxes) and there have been few if
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Looking at the phenomenon comparatively, the United States incarcerates between five and eight times the number of people incarcerated in other
advanced industrial nations.' 64 The overwhelming majority of Western European states have no ban on voting at all, 165 or only ban voting for specific criminals who commit certain serious crimes, usually as explicit additional aspects of
their prison sentence.' 66 While twelve European states completely ban voting
for incarcerated prisoners, 167 ten of these twelve states are former Eastern Bloc
countries with a history of limited enfranchisement. 168 Of the two Western
European countries, Spain and the United Kingdom, Spain rarely disenfranchises its prisoners, 169 and the practice of blanket bans in the United Kingdom
has been recently condemned by the European Court of Human Rights in Hirst
v. United Kingdom (No 2).170 Further, while some countries disqualify ex-felons
from voting, "the sanction is purposefully and narrowly targeted, and the number of disenfranchised people is probably in the dozens or hundreds, In the
United States, the171disqualification is automatic, pursues no defined purpose and
affects millions."'
Not only has the European Court of Human Rights condemned practices
like those in the U.S., but so have the Supreme Court of Israel, 172 the Supreme
Court of Canada, 173 and the Constitutional Court of South Africa. 174 These
any terrorists threats coming from unauthorized immigrants, especially from Mexico. The nineteen 9/11 terrorists entered the country legally. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 27 (2004).
164 ISPAHANI,

supra note 155, at 3.

Id. Seventeen European states do not ban voting at all, nine of which are Western European
states. Id.
166 Id.at 7. Eleven states fall in this category, with eight of them coming from Western Europe
(Greece is counted in this tradition). Id.
167
Id. at 8.
165

168

Id.

169

Id.
681 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (discussing a U.K. law denying the vote to all prisoners, stating,

170

"Such a general, automatic, and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right
must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide the margin
might be, and as being incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1."); IsPAHANI, supra note 155,
at8.
171

ISPAHANI,

supra note 155, at 6.

See HCJ 2757/06 Hilla Alrai v. Minister of Interior [1996] IsrSC 50(2) 18 (refusing to disenfranchise Yigal Amir, the individual convicted of assassinating Yitzak Rabin, the Israeli Prime
Minister). "[W]ithout the right to elect, the foundation of all other rights is undermined ....
Accordingly every society should take great care not to interfere with the right to elect except in
extreme circumstances." Id.at 133-39.
173 See Sauvd v. Canada, [20021 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.) (striking down a law which denied the
right to vote to those serving more than two years). "Denying a citizen the right to vote denies the
basis of democratic legitimacy ....[Ihf we accept that governmental power in a democracy flows
from the citizens, it is difficult to see how that power can legitimately be used to disenfranchise
the very citizens from whom the government's power flows." Id. at para. 32.
172
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countries recognize that denying prisoners the right to vote is not undesirable
merely because it harms the individual who loses the right, but because it harms
the democratic legitimacy of the state. As McLachlin CJ, writing for the majority in Sauvi v. Canada, said:
The right of all citizens to vote, regardless of virtue or mental
ability or other distinguishing features underpins the legitimacy
of Canadian democracy and Parliament's claim to power. A
government that restricts the franchise to a select portion of citizens is a government that weakens its ability to function as the
legitimate representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardizes
its claims to representative democracy, and175erodes the basis of
its right to convict and punish lawbreakers.
Denying prisoners the right to vote, particularly after they have served
their time, is a throw-back to pre-democratic times, when "democracy" was
reserved for certain classes of people. The current trend sends the message that
prisoners, and even ex-prisoners, are no longer a part of the same "democratic"
America. This is particularly troubling, given that this class is greatly overrepresented by minorities, the economically disadvantaged, the educationally deprived and those with mental and physical disabilities. Taking away this right
sends the message that these people are second class citizens and, in effect, "illegal Americans."
V.

THE TORT REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

The current wave of tort reform has been variously referred to as "tort
deform," "tort retrenchment," "corporate cost shifting" or "corporate welfare."
While some would like to depict the recent trend in tort law as a semiautonomous development in the law to meet the needs of the day, this is not an
accurate view. The current wave of tort "reform" is tied to a systematic and
coordinated campaign176 "by an army of corporations, foundations, lobbyists,
174 See National Institute of Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders (NICRO),

Erasmus and Schwagerl v. Minister of Home Affairs 2004 (3) SA 4 (CC) (S. Afr.) (striking down
the Electoral Laws Amended Act 34 of 2003, which denied the right to vote for those serving
prison sentences that did not have the option of a fine); August andAnother v. Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (8) SA 99 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that the Electoral Commission, by not
providing the means and mechanisms for prisoners to vote, had breached the prisoner's rights to
vote under the Constitution).
175
Sauvd v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, para. 34.
176
FEINMAN, supra note 9. According to Feinman, Federalist Society members boasted that
they occupied all of the assistant attorneys general positions and more than half of all other political appointments within the Reagan-Meese Justice Department. Id. at 189. Further, one fourth of
all federal judicial candidates under the second Bush administration were recommended by the
Federalist Society and most of the lawyers in the White House Counsel's office have been active
members. Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110

litigation centers, think tanks politicians and academics," 177 to unmake or undo
developments over the last 100 years across the common law.17 8 This wave has
its roots in a comprehensive view of the role of government in society that was
in its heyday over 100 years ago, namely the laissez-faire view. 179 The idea is a
return to a time of minimal government interference with capitalists and their
market and to pre-modern or classical legal thought, under which judges are
mere neutral referees, rather than guardians of justice. Here, individual negative
rights, embodying such notions as "freedom of contract" and "buyer beware,"
trump public policy, embodying ideas such as "corporate responsibility," "consumer safety," and the need for the government to intervene sometimes to ensure that people actually are free. As pointed out above, this is a return to
Lochner era values. 180 It is worth remembering that the Lochner era came to an
end, in part, because of democratic developments and the realization that unchecked private power in the hands of the few could be just as large a threat to
the actual freedom and equality of the people as unchecked public power.
A common critique of the recent "tort reform campaign" is that it is
based on misinformation, if not lies. 181 E. Patrick Hubbard has deftly noted that
the "tort reform" movement has adopted a political model of truth, rather than a
rational model of truth, and that this model has been very successful, in part,
because we live in the "age of truthiness.,,' 82 "Truthiness" which won the word
of the year award from both the American Dialectic Society in 2005183 and Mer177

Id. at 189.

178 Jay Feinman traces this campaign all the way back to Ronald Reagan's inaugural address,

where he stated that "Government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem." FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 172. The tort reform campaign came together in the Tort Policy
Working Group within the Reagan-Meese justice department. Id. at 186 (citing the TORT POLICY
WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY

(1986)). See also Dawn Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional
Power: PresidentialInfluences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003). For a comprehensive database on state tort reform totaling over 1,000 pages see RONEN AVRAHAM, DATABASE
OF STATE TORT LAW REFORMS (2006) (Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 06-08),
availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=902711.
179 FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 172 (citing JOHN B. JUDIS & TuY TEIXEIRA, THE EMERGING
DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY 151-52 (2002)).
180
Id. at 3-5, 7-18. Compare this with Law, supra note 30 (making similar comments regard-

ing the Rehnquist Court).
181
See Lind, supra note 37, at 719; Abel, supra note 37, at 556; Goldberg, supra note 15;
Priest, supra note 37, at 683; Eaton, supra note 37; Witt, supra note 37; Marc Galanter, An Oil
Strike in Hell: ContemporaryLegends about the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 717, 72122 (1998) [hereinafter Galanter, Oil Strike].
182
Hubbard, supra note 40, at 530 (citing Frank Rich, Op-Ed, Truthiness 101: From Frey to
Alito, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, § 4, at 16, available at 2006 WLNR 1184978 for the view that
we live in the "age of truthiness").
183
Press Release, American Dialect Society, Truthiness Voted 2005 Word of the Year (Jan. 6,
2006), http://www.americandialect.orgWords of theYear_ 2005.pdf.
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riam-Webster in 2006,184was popularized and given its current meaning on the
Colbert Report by Stephen Colbert. Mr. Colbert defines "truthiness" as "sort of
what you want to be true, as opposed to what the facts support.... Truthiness is
a truth larger than the facts that would comprise it-if you cared about facts,
which you don't, if you care about truthiness."'' 85 Jay Feinman goes further in
Unmaking Law, stating, "[t]he problem with the conservative campaign, however, is that it is false. Not debatable, or a matter of opinion or political viewpoint, but false."' 186 Its falsity is based in many little lies, in which cases are
exaggerated, and the amount of and the effect of frivolous lawsuits, the impact
of regulations on property rights, as well as the impact of liberal adjudication on
the sanctity of contract are all overstated. 187 When combined, they feed into the
big lie that the common law has been
hijacked by greedy plaintiffs and lawyers,
1 88
judges.
activist
liberal
by
as
well
as
The tort reform campaign has been principally advanced by large corporate interests, who, as shown above, have the means necessary to make their
voices heard.189 They often use mass media as a vehicle for spreading their
ideas. 190 Most of these "tort reform" advocates have little reason, beyond their
own self-interest, to endorse the tort reform agenda.' 9' These so-called reformers have the "singular purpose of furthering their political agenda by enraging
the public over a civil justice system supposedly gone awry."' 192 Corporations
have portrayed themselves as blameless victims, while portraying individuals
(and their lawyers) as the aggressors. 93 They accomplish this by distorting the
http://www.merriam-webster.com/info/06words.htm.
Hubbard, supra note 40, at 530 (citing Jacques Steinberg, Truthiness, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 25,
2005, § 4, at 3, available at 2005 WLNR 20926880, quoting Colbert's comments from a "recent
interview")).
186
FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 190.
187
Id. at 191.
184
185

188

Id.
See HALTOM &

McCANN, supra note 40, at 8; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21; Robert S.
Peck et al., Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 397
(2000); Galanter, Oil Strike, supra note 181. For example, one estimate states that, in 1999, the
insurance industry alone spent $85.6 million for lobbying. HALTOM & MCCANN, supranote 40, at
48. A report compiled by the California Nurses Association/National Nurses Organizing Committee's research arm, the Institute for Health and Socio-Economic Policy notes that "healthcare
industry contributions to the 18 currently announced Republican and Democratic presidential
candidates total an aggregate $12.8 million since 1989, over $3.7 million of that amount just in the
first quarter of 2007 alone." New Report Details Healthcare Industry's Massive Spending in
Presidential Campaign, Federal Lobbying, PR Newswire. June 22, 2007, available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/06-22-2007/00
04613490&EDATE.
190
See HALTOM & McCANN, supra note 40, at 8; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 51.
189

191 Peck et al., supra note 189, at 398.
192

Id.

193

Galanter, Oil Strike, supra note 181, at 733; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 4.
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facts and turning "bizarre cases that almost happened into a report of something
typical and prevalent."' 194 There are generally four characteristics of "tort tales"
that "tort reformers" tell: 1) elegance (they communicate moral messages that
are instantly understandable);195 2) stereotypic characterization (plaintiffs are
blameworthy, defendants are not); 3) holler of the dollar (plaintiffs are always
greedy); and 4) extraordinary occurrences symbolize ordinary outcomes (as if
they were normal occurrences). 96 These types of unfounded claims are typical
of the type of ammunition used by tort reformers. 97 For example, while tort
reformers claim that punitive damages are "out of control,"' 198 studies have
shown99 that they are only awarded in about 6% of all the cases won by plaintiffs.

Given the data and arguments put forth above in Parts Ell and IV, one
does not need to be a conspiracy theorist to predict that a well-organized and
well-funded campaign to institute reform for the "haves" by the "haves" in the
area of tort law would be successful, even if it was not good for the majority of
Americans. The pervasive disinformation that accompanies this movement has,
no doubt, acted like grease on a pig for those fighting against these "reforms,"
while acting like grease on the cogs of the machine for those pushing the reforms. This undermines the democratic principle that political choices are the
result of deliberation among political equals. Distorted deliberations make it
nearly impossible for people to give voice to their interests or preferences, since
the disinformation often results in people thinking that they want choice A,
when they really would prefer choice B, if they knew all the facts. Although
there have been countless studies refuting most of the key assertions used to
justify the "tort reform" movement, its jaundiced view of the legal system still
flourishes. No doubt, it does so because these "tort tales" are cast as legends
Galanter, Oil Strike, supra note 181, at 728. For example, Galanter refers to a case where a
woman claimed she lost her psychic abilities due to a CAT scan and a million dollar verdict was
given but later thrown out. Id. at 726-27. Galanter also refers to the McDonald's case, where the
fact that the coffee spilt was a 180 degrees, caused third degree burns and the plaintiff needed skin
grafts, is often left out of the story. Id. at 731-33. Further, it is seldom reported that the $2.9
million verdict against McDonald's was reduced to $480,000. Id. Feinman refers to a case where
a man sued the dairy industry and Safeway stores claiming that drinking milk increased his risk of
stroke. FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 24. In reality, however, the claim was dismissed. Id.
195
As Marc Galanter puts it, "[t]he jaundiced view resonates with cultural themes of individualism and self-reliance and has a strong nostalgic component." Galanter, Oil Strike, supra note
181, at 720.
196
HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 40, at 62-63. For an interesting example of this strategy
see American Tort Reform Association, Looney Lawsuits, http://www.atra.org/display/13 (last
visited July 24, 2007). Also, in 1995, the ATRA received half of its budget from tobacco companies. HALTOM & McCANN, supra note 40, at 46.
197
Further, tort reformers consistently ignore positive aspects of the tort system, such as deterrence. See Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV.
U. L. REV. 77, 90 (1993) [hereinafter Galanter, Nowhere].
198
FEiNmAN, supra note 9, at 69.
199
Id. See also infra note 275 for other low estimates on the award of punitive damages.
194
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that resonate with the basic themes of individual responsibility and self-reliance,
which are core to American political and legal culture. 200 The result is a perverse form of corporate welfare, where companies are able to shift responsibility
for their conduct off their shoulders and onto the shoulders of individual consumers.
The remainder of this Article begins with a brief discussion of both the
main achievements in democratic tort reform, as well as the recent retrenchment
of some of those achievements, along with other regressive changes in tort law.
Then, it examines the role of the Supreme Court in tort reform to show the unprecedented extent to which that institution has engaged in an area generally
considered the domain of the states, their courts and Congress, to the detriment
of the people and of democracy. It demonstrates that as American democracy
goes, so does tort reform.
Before beginning the exploration of tort reform, it might be wise to respond to a preliminary objection. One may argue that, since the bulk of progressive tort reform during the 1960s and 1970s was judicially created and most
of the tort reform since the 1980s is legislative, the latter trend of regressive tort
reform must have a better democratic pedigree than the former. This is dubious
for at least two reasons. First, it is by no means settled that the bulk of progressive tort reform in the former period was judicial (see Part [V.A. below). More
importantly, given the evidence above that America's traditional "democratic"
institutions (the executive and legislative branches) are skewed, or corrupted
from the perspective of democratic values, it follows that courts, which are generally insulated from interest group power politics and required to justify their
decisions to the public through written decisions, may have a better chance of
delivering decisions that are democratically justifiable. This is particularly true
in the area of personal injury tort law, where, generally, the plaintiff class is
unorganized and under-funded, and the defendant class is well-organized and
well-funded.2 °1 Potential victims have neither the motive nor the easy means for
organizing. Most people do not think of themselves as potential plaintiffs and,
thus, are not generally mobilized to press their concerns. In contrast, most businesses and their associations do consider the potential of being a defendant, and
thus, they have both the motive and the means to press their interests in tort reform through experts, lobbying, and campaign contributions. 20 2 Richard Abel
also notes that the plaintiffs' bar may put its own interests ahead of plaintiffs'

200

Galanter, Oil Strike, supra note 181, at 722. As Kevin O'Leary notes in KEVIN O'LEARY,

SAVING DEMOCRACY (2006), democratic theorists as diverse as Jon Elster, Jurgen Habermas and
John Rawls's all hold the view that "political choice, to be legitimate, must be the outcome of
deliberation about ends among free, equal, and rational agents." O'LEARY, id. at 163 (quoting Jon
Elster, Introduction,in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 5 (Jon Elster ed., 1998)).
201 Of course this is not true of business to business torts, but business to business torts are
largely unaffected by tort reform. Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1080-85.
202
See Abel, supra note 37, at 536-37.
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reform, for example,
interests in its confrontation with the defense bar over tort
20 3
schemes.
compensation
automobile
no-fault
on issues like
One way around the lack of influence in the judicial sphere is to contract out of court-based dispute resolution and into arbitration, where businesses,
particularly businesses that are repeat players, have a distinct advantage.2 ° The
other tactic is to try to break down the barriers that insulate courts as much as
possible, and this takes place, in part, through concerted efforts to get pro-tort
reform judges elected and appointed. For instance, the movement to dismantle
strict liability in products cases in California came after three liberal judges
were voted off the bench and replaced with conservatives in 1986.205 The politicization of the judiciary took off under former President Reagan and continues
to thrive today. 2°6 As David Law notes, "commentators have singled out
Reagan for taking the politicization of the judiciary to new heights by implementing a centralized high-level process for the ideological vetting of judicial
According to one commentator, Reagan was very successful in
candidates.
appointing circuit court justices that remained faithful to his conservative
agenda.208 Since Reagan, this has been reinforced by the active participation of
conservative groups in the process of judicial nominations. 2 9

203

Id. at 537.

204

See Part V.B.4 infra for the Supreme Court's support of this move. See also Bryant G.

Garth, Tilting the Justice System from ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in
Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 927 (2002).
205
Stephan D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent CaliforniaExperience with
"New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 455 (1999).
206
Note the early Department of Justice reports under Reagan. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION iii (1988), available at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/acs/conference/meese-

memos/year2000.pdf (focusing on 15 key areas of constitutional controversy likely to go before
the Court between 1988 and 2000).
207
David Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate and the Prisoner's
Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 479, 485-86 (2005) (referring to Elliot E. Slotnick, FederalJudicial Selection in the New Millennium, Prologue,36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 587, 589-90 (2003); and
Michael J. Gerhardt, JudicialSelection As War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 667, 678 (2003) (remarking upon Reagan's reputation for attending to the ideology of his judicial nominees)).
208

SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT

THROUGH REAGAN 307
209
FEINMAN, supra

(1997).
note 9, at 189. See also Nina Totenberg, Conservative Groups Push for

More Judicial Confirmations, NPR, June 28, 2006, available at http://www.npr
.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5517409. "Conservative groups are urging President Bush
and Senate Republicans to push harder to get more of the president's judicial nominees approved.
Social conservatives wanted more confirmations before the November elections in case the GOP
loses Senate seats." Id.
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A.

Tort reform in general

1.

Progressive democratic tort reform

The earliest sign of democracy reinforcing tort reform began in the early
1900s, when workmen's compensation schemes started to spread. The schemes
attempted to find collective justice for workers who were severely disadvantaged by the extant rules of the tort system. 2 10 However, other than workmen's
compensation and Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., little

reform occurred,
until the "Democratic Expansionary Era" after the Second
2 11
World War.
During the Democratic Expansionary Era, the courts moved from a
view of the tort system as providing case-by-case corrective justice, to a view of
the system as a mechanism for collective justice, or providing justice across
classes of cases.212 This transition, in part, contributed to courts using tort law,
not only for restorative justice (putting plaintiffs back to where they were before
the tort) but also for other social goals, namely deterring wrongs and providing
incentives for manufacturers to make their products safer for society.21 3 Courts
stopped merely accepting the status quo distributions of power and wealth and
began tailoring corrective justice to collective and distributive justice concerns.
Democratic developments during this Era resulted in the removal of
immunity at both the federal level and the state level.214 It began with the Fed-

210

The extant rules included such defenses as the fellow servant exception to master servant

liability, voluntary assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. See ARTHUR LARSON, 1-2
LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §§ 2.03, 2.07-2.08 (2005). Some courts did temper
these defenses in the late 1800s and early 1900s allowing more workers to gain compensation,
however the bulk of workers injured on the job were left without compensation or with very little
compensation. Id. at § 2.04, 2.07. See also Part V. infra. See LARSON, supra, at § 4, 7. These
were also years of progress for the women's suffrage movement. Note that women's rights to tort
compensation were also limited from the 1800s to the modem period. See Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 21, at 34-35. See also Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts:
1860-1930, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79 (1998).
211
Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051-55 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that Buick
owed a duty of care to the ultimate purchaser despite the absence of privity); Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 21, at 38 (describing the period from 1945 to 1980 as the "Democratic Expansionary
Era").
212
FEiNmAN, supra note 9, at 53 (Feinman puts the starting date at 1920). The previous era
(the late 1800s to early 1900s) is often recognized as an era where the compensatory function of
tort law was constricted. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW INAMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 61
(1980).
213
There of course is the challenge that this should be left to legislators to decide. Cf. Abel,
supra note 37.
214
Sovereign immunity from suit was abandoned in France by 1905. The first case to undermine the doctrine occurred in 1873 with the Tribunal des Conflicts cases of l'arret Blanco TC 8
Feb 1873, D.1873.17 (according jurisdiction to the administrative courts for actions brought
against the state for damages caused by actions of persons employed in the public service) and the
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eral Tort Claims Act of 1946, 28 U.S.C. section 2875, and most states followed
with similar legislation opening up their courts for suits, thereby making the
state and the people equal before the law.215 In the 1960s, Congress passed the
1964 Civil Rights Act, which provided statutory tort actions for discrimination
in employment, housing, education, and public accommodations on the basis of
race, sex, national origin, or religion.216 Developments also occurred in the area
of consumer protection and products liability,2 17 which were crystallized in the
Restatement Second of Torts in 1965.218 Comparative fault did not begin to
overtake the draconian rule/defense of contributory negligence (which, in many
cases, completely barred a plaintiff from bringing a claim if she was at all negligent) until the 1970s. 2 19 The courts also narrowed the general "no duty" rule in
torts (one is not responsible for others and has no positive duties towards them)
during the 1970s, when they began imposing duties on people in "special relations" with others (e.g., psychiatrists and patients, common carriers and passengers, schools and their pupils, landlords and tenants, and businesses and their
customers). 220 These reforms helped to consolidate democracy by providing
enforcement mechanisms for hard-won democratic rights and making it easier
for those, whose rights had been violated, to access the justice system and vindicate those rights.
2.

Regressive tort reform

The Tort Policy Working Group from the Ronald Reagan-Edwin Meese
Justice Department, one of the main catalysts of the counter-revolution in torts,
came to life, in part, because of the liability insurance crisis of the 1980s. 221 The
Group identified a number of "causes" of the so-called "crisis '222 and a set of
recommendations or strategies for attacking the "crisis." They summarily excluded all other explanations besides the civil justice system, and thus, unsurdoctrine was solidified by 1905 in the case of Tomaso Grecco, CE 10 Feb 1905, D. 1906.3.81. See
DUNCAN FAiRGRIEVE, STATE LIABILITY iNTORT: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 12-13 (2003).
215
See FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 56-57; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 268 (2000).

England also followed suit in 1947 with the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, although vestiges of
immunity still exist.

FAIRGRIEVE, supra note 214, at 12, 14-16.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (2001).
217
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). See also FEINMAN,
supra note 9, at 55-56. Rustad and Koenig note a whole range of progressive decisions by the
California courts during this era. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 45-49.
218
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 402A (1965).
219
Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1,at 1069-70.
220
Id. at 1066-69.
221
FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 25.
222
Id. at 26. The "causes" identified by the Group included the decline of fault as the basis for
liability, the undermining of causation, the explosive growth in damage awards, and the high
transaction costs of the system. Id.
216
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prisingly, their recommendations or strategies focused only on attacking that
system by: 1) making it harder for injury victims to get into court; 2) making it
more difficult to win once plaintiffs are in court; and 3) restricting damage recoveries for plaintiffs who do win.223 This, in perhaps oversimplified terms, has
provided the core agenda for the tort reform movement ever since.224 Recently,
the movement has also adopted the strategy of preempting state tort law through
the promulgation of federal administrative rules.225
a.

Keeping plaintiffs out of court

There are a whole range of mechanisms or tactics that help reduce the
number of claims made by potential plaintiffs (other than reducing negligence
and making products safer). One mechanism for keeping plaintiffs out of court
has been to make it less attractive for lawyers to take cases, by putting limits on
contingency fees 226 and creating "early offer" mechanisms (which include attorney fee limits) for economic damages, which would preclude, or make it very
difficult to receive non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering.227 Another tactic is to make it difficult for states to hire attorneys for complex litigation (e.g., tobacco and gun cases). 228 And finally, one can make it harder for
people to join together in class actions.229
This last tactic is embodied in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
which transfers many class actions from state courts to federal courts. 230 The
federalization of class actions may act to deny or impede plaintiffs' access to
223

Id. at 25, 27. For a compelling argument that the liability insurance crises of the 1970s, mid

80s and in 2001 were all due to the market interest rate returns on insurance company investments
rather than personal injury claims, see JOANNE DOROSHOW & J. ROBERT HUNTER, INSURANCE
"CRISIS" OFFICIALLY OVER - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES HAVE BEEN STABLE FOR A YEAR 3
(2006), http://insurance-reform.org/pr/MMSOFTMARKET.pdf. See also Frank A. Perrecone &
Lisa R. Fabiano, The Fleecing of Seriously Injured Medical MalpracticeVictims in Illinois, 26 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 527 (2006).
224
Id. Note the structure of this overview follows the structure of FEINMAN, supra note 9, at
27-46, but is not limited to its substance.
225
See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 40, at 538 (predicting that this will be one of the new forums
for pushing for reforms). See also Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal
Agencies and the Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007).
226
FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 27-28.
227
Id. at 29-30.
228
Id. at 30-31.
229
Id. at 31-32.
230
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1335(a)(1),
1453, 1603(b)(3), 1711-15). The literature on the act is extensive. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff &
Mark Herrmann, The Class Action FairnessAct: An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class Settlements,
80 TUL. L. REV. 1695 (2006). See id. at 1696 n.1 (an extensive list of academic commentary on
the Act). As Klonoff and Herrmann state, "It is well known that under CAFA, most major class
actions, including virtually all multistate class actions, will now be heard in federal court." Id. at
1697.
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justice for a number of reasons, 3 including the relative difficulty of certifying
classes in federal courts,232 and delays that result from further burdening the
already overcrowded federal courts.233 Further, to the extent that conservatives
have managed to take over the federal judiciary and/or to secure anti-litigation
justices on the federal bench, one would expect more bias against plaintiffs, in
general, and against class actions, in particular.234 As shown below, access to
courts can also be limited through the enforcement of arbitration agreements,
which often preclude class actions235 and by definition limit access to the courts,
both in the first instance and as a matter of review.
b.

Making it harderfor plaintiffs to win cases

The more direct route to reducing the number and amount of claims is
to change the liability rules to make it harder for plaintiffs to win when they get
to court. This occurs by making liability less strict in products liability cases,23 6
setting up procedural obstacles in medical malpractice cases,237 and providing
231

Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action FairnessAct in a Truly FairManner, 80 TUL.

L. REv. 1645, 1654 (2006).
232
The federal courts' reluctance to issue class certification is well documented (referring to S.
Rep. No. 106-420, at 57-59 (2000) (noting minority senators' views on CAFA) (noting also that a
review of forty-three class action cases involving life insurance marketing practices found that
cases were nearly twice the certification in state court as in federal court) (referring to PUBLIC
CITIZEN, UNFAIRNESS INCORPORATED: THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGN AGAINST CONSUMER CLASS

ACTIONS 85 (2003), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF2B 13.pdf).
233 Kanner, supra note 231, at 1654. For the view that class actions are undemocratic because
they have led to substantive changes in the law, which did not go through the legislative process,
see Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the DemocraticDifficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of
PrivateLitigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71 (2003).
234
For an account of the Republican efforts to appoint conservatives to the bench since Reagan,
see, e.g., Law, supra note 30, at 485-86 (noting that Reagan succeeded in making ideological
considerations paramount: by one observer's count, over three-quarters of his circuit court appointees furthered his conservative agenda, with the balance appearing to reward the party faithful). Id. at 490.
235 See infra Part V.B.4.
236 See FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 34-40. See infra Part V. In fact, the move is to return certain
forms of products liability to a negligence standard.
237
See, e.g., Thomas Baker, Reconsidering the HarvardMedical Malpractice Study: Conclusions About the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 501, 511 (2005).
Commenting on the effect of the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study (HMPS), Baker notes:
[P]olicymakers have seized on the weakest aspect of the HMPS, the analysis
of the validity of medical malpractice claims, and used that analysis to justify
imposing caps on damages in medical malpractice cases and additional procedural hurdles for medical malpractice claimants. For that reason the practical
impact of the HMPS may well have been to expand the gap between the large
number of people who are injured by medical malpractice and the few people
who are compensated and to increase the likelihood that the compensation that
is received will be inadequate.
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immunity from suit for certain industries. 23 8 This has been the case with gun
manufacturers, 22399 as well as with biomaterials manufacturers. 240 This also
makes it less likely that plaintiffs and their lawyers will sue in the first place.
c.

Capping damages and making punitive damages harder
to get

Finally, one of the most active areas of tort reform has centered around
limiting damages, which has occurred by placing limits on joint and several
liability, 24' limiting the collateral source rule, 242 and capping non-economic
damages, 43 including both punitive damages 244 and pain and suffering damages. 45 In addition to placing caps on punitive damages, tort reform has also

Id.
238

This also echoes the reinvigorated state immunity doctrine of the Supreme Court. See infra

Part V.B.5.
FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 33; Daniel Feldman, Legislating or Litigating Public Policy
239
Change: Gunmaker Tort Liability 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 140 (2004). But see John Fowler,
Will a Repeal of Gun ManufacturerImmunity from Civil Suits Untie the Hands of the Judiciary?,
34 McGEORGE L. REV. 339 (2003) (repealing immunity in California).
240
FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 33-34. See also James D. Kerouac, Note, A CriticalAnalysis of
the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998 as Federal Tort Reform Policy, 7 B.U. J. SC. &
TECH. L. 327 (2001).
241 See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF MUT. INS. COS., JOINT AND SEVERAL LIAB. REFORM STATES,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/JointAndSeveralLiability.asp (last visited July 24, 2007)
(the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies' report on Joint and Several Liability
Rule Reform).
242
See NAT'L ASS'N OF MUT. INS. COS., COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE REFORM,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRule.asp (last visited July 24, 2007).
Note that according to Kevin S. Marshall and Patrick W. Fitzgerald, forty-four states have enacted
legislation allowing for the consideration of the payment of collateral source benefits. Kevin S.
Marshall & Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule and Its Abolition: An Economic
Perspective, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 61 app.1 (2005) (arguing that tort reform designed to
undermine the collateral source rule is the product of defense-oriented public interest group lobbying and has resulted in arbitrary wealth transferring legislation that not only undermines the legitimate purposes of tort law, namely, compensation, indemnity, restitution and deterrence, but is
economically unsound).
See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF MUT. INS. Cos., NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGE REFORM, http://
243
www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/NoneconomicDamage.asp (last visited July 24, 2007).
See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF MUT. INS. COS., PUNITIVE DAMAGE REFORM,
244

http://

www.namic.org/reports/tortReformlPunitiveDamage.asp (last visited July 24, 2007).
245
See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 40-46. Medical malpractice reform is one very significant area of regressive reform. Nockleby & Curreri believe that reform efforts in this area can be
traced to the abandonment of the locality rule of practice which undermined the "conspiracy of
silence" by holding doctors to a national standard of care. Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at
1023.
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included legislation that increases the plaintiff's burden of proof in order to receive punitive damages. 246 As Michael L. Rustad explains:
Forty-five out of the fifty-one jurisdictions either do not recognize punitive damages or have enacted one or more restrictions
on the remedy since 1979. These reforms include capping punitive damages, bifurcating the amount of punitive damages from
the rest of the trial, raising the burden of proof, allocating a
share of punitive damages to the state, and restricting use of
evidence of corporate wealth. The handful of jurisdictions that
have yet to enact tort reforms are mostly punitive damages cold
spots rather than tort hellholes.24 7
All of these mechanisms undermine achievements from the 1960s and
1970s, which made it easier for relatively weak and unorganized victims to organize and to access justice to vindicate their rights. They undermine the deterrent effects of tort law, designed to keep consumers safe and hold those who
profit from placing dangerous products into the stream of commerce responsible
for those products. These changes benefit the few, at the expense of the majority of Americans.
d.

"Silent Tort Reform:"

248 administrativepreemption of

state tort law

One of the most recent, and undemocratic, developments in tort reform
has been the use of administrative regulations to preempt state tort law. A recent panel at the South Eastern Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting in
2007 aptly described the issue when it stated: "Unable to achieve tort reform
through legislation, the Bush Administration has engaged in a concerted effort

246

See, e.g., JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 4:60 (3rd ed.

2006) (Westlaw). See also 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 706 (requiring clear and convincing evidence and, in some jurisdictions, proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
247
Rustad, supra note 40, at 1300.
Stephan Labaton, 'Silent Tort Reform' Is Overriding States' Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
248
2006, at C5 (arguing that Bush's administrative officials are promulgating regulations to preempt
state law regarding safety standards and liability for safety standards). Labaton has also reported
on Bush's attempt to nominate Michael Baroody, executive vice president and top lobbyist of the
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), to head the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). Stephan Labaton, Bush Asked to Reconsider Safety Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2007, at Late Edition-Final, § A, at 23. NAM is the largest trade association for manufacturers,
and thus appointing Baroody to head the commission would be like putting the fox in charge of
the henhouse. Or as the opposition put it, "If you want to guard the interests of the hens, you don't
put the fox in charge of the henhouse," Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), quoted in Kathy Schalch,
Baroody Withdraws Nomination for Top CPSC Spot, NPR.org, May 23, 2007, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 10362433.
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to achieve the same end through the administrative process. 249 The panel 25
251
Preamble"
by
and Catherine Sharkey in her recent article on "Preemption
notes that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),252 the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) have all included language in recent rules or proposed rules
that claim to preempt state law.253 All three agencies deal with product safety:
prescription drug labeling by the FDA, fire resistance standards for bedding and
mattresses by the CPSC 254 and crush resistance standards for roofs on sportutility vehicles by the NHTSA.255
Sharkey warns that these examples could be just the tip of the iceberg if
regulatory agencies start placing preemption clauses in all of their rules and
regulations.25 6 Consistent with part B, below, Sharkey also notes that, while the
federal courts are deferential when it comes to agency claims for preemption,
they are not deferential to those agencies when it comes to implying private
rights of action.257 This could result in the complete substitution of public
remedies for private remedies (i.e. the evisceration of private causes of action in
these areas).258
The problem with preemption through regulation is threefold. First,
preemption in these cases interferes with the states' ability to regulate for the
249

SOUTH EASTERN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS ANNUAL MEETING, July 29-Aug. 4, 2007,

program at 12, available at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/seals/program%2007July1 0.pdf.
250
Id.
251
Sharkey, supra note 225, at 227-28.
252
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201,
314, 601).
253
Sharkey, supra note 225, at 227-28.
254
Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open-Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg.
13,472, 13,496 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633).
255 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223,

49,247-48 (proposed Aug. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
256
Sharkey, supra note 225, at 227-28.
257
Id. at 228-29, 245-50. Sharkey noted that perhaps the Supreme Court would clarify its
doctrine with regards to deference in preemption cases in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 126 S.
Ct. 2900 (2006). The Court has since decided Watters. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S.
Ct. 1559 (2007) (upholding the preemption of Michigan mortgage lending laws by regulations
promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) that state subsidiaries of
national banks are subject to the superintendence of the OCC and this preempts state regulation).
Needless to say the 5-3 decision with Justice Stevens, the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia joining
in dissent is consistent with the deferential approach to preemption through regulation. Although
the majority never addresses the issue of Chevron deference head on, it appears to have upheld the
Sixth Circuit's decision to uphold the district court's use of the Chevron standard. Id. at 1566.
The dissent went to some length to argue that the Chevron standard of deference was not appropriate in this case and even if the Chevron standard was used the OCC's justification would fail
the standard. Id. at 1584-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258 Sharkey, supra note 225, at 239.
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safety and well-being of its citizens by placing a federal ceiling on those protections and immunizing potential wrongdoers from suit in state court under state
law. Secondly, the federal agencies that are empowered to police these areas of
product safety are often understaffed and/or unable to respond to new safety
risks. 259 Finally, agency preemption without congressional mandates is not
transparent or democratic. They constitute "silent tort reform" and "backdoor
federalization. 2 6 °
e.

Illegal Americans revisited

It should come as little surprise that there has been regressive tort reform at the federal level in the area of prison litigation that achieves all three
goals, i.e. making it harder for prisoners to get into court, making it more difficult to win once they are there, and restricting damage recoveries for them when
they do win.261 As criminologist James Robertson notes:
The [Prison Litigation Reform Act] constrains inmates by requiring them to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing
suit; pay filing fees; and forgo damages for emotional injuries
absent a prior physical injury. While the Act permits the judiciary to sua sponte dismiss claims failing to state a cause of action, its power to grant prospective relief cannot extend beyond
correcting the right in question; and the relief can be terminated

259

In addition to the Broody incident mentioned above, the CPSC is understaffed and has been

unable to act under its full powers since the summer of 2006 because it requires three commissioners to make certain decisions and issue subpoenas. Darryl Forten, CPSC FallingApart, Our
Safety At Risk, AMERICAN CHRONICLE, Apr. 23, 2007, available at http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=25097. According to Forten, "The CPSC originally
had 786 full time employees when it began over 30 years ago. Currently there are only 420 full
time employees, which will likely be cut to 401 employees in 2008." Id. For the view that the
EPA is understaffed and underfinanced, see Alexei Barrioneuvo, Food Imports Often Escape
Scrutiny, NY TIMEs, May 1, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/01/business
/Olfood.html?ex=l 186459200&en a7d1933f633c387c&ei=5070. A recent article notes that 24
states enacted recalls of potentially dangerous tires from China before waiting for NHTSA to act.
Mark Huffman, States Recall Chinese Tires: Federal Recall Stalled as Importer Runs Low on
Cash, Aug. 7, 2007,
available at http://www.consumeraffairs.com/newsO4/2007/08/
china tires05.html. (arguing that the states were, once again, out in front of the federal government when it came to safety).
260
See, e.g., Labaton, supra note 248; Sharkey, supra note 225, at 228 (referring to Samuel
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53 UCLA L. REv. 1353 (2006)).
Although Sharkey posits a range of mechanisms at agencies and courts' disposal that could "harness this development in service of transparency and... accountability," the system as it stands
"is in sharp tension with the conventional notion of a democratically accountable broadly representative body (e.g. Congress) taking the lead in politically charged areas that implicate balance of
federal-state relations." Sharkey, supra note 225, at 229, 259.
261 Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
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within two years or, in some instances, sooner. In addition, the
Act caps fees for attorneys and special masters.262
These reforms severely limit the rights of victims to have access to justice and to be compensated for the violation of their rights. The extent of the
limits placed on prisoners, the most vulnerable and politically disempowered
minority population in America, is particularly troubling. It is the most drastic
demonstration of the symbiotic relationship between the loss of political equality and the further erosion of rights through regressive tort reform.
B.

The role of the Supreme Court in regressive tort "reform"

For the greater part of the history and evolution of American tort law,
the U.S. Supreme Court has not been a central actor. Few, if any, of the major
advances in tort law during the 1960s and 1970s are credited to that institution.263 This is because tort law is traditionally either a part of state common
law or state and federal statutory law. Heavy involvement by the Supreme
Court in either of these areas raises the possibility of activism, either in the form
of the Court overstepping boundaries based on federalism concerns, or based on
separation of powers concerns. Of course, it may be contended that either the
states or Congress has overstepped, rather than the Supreme Court. In either
event, significant legal change in the area of civil litigation and torts at the Supreme Court level signals that something more significant than the normal ebb
and flow of state-based tort reform initiatives is afoot. While the wave of tort
reform, beginning in the 1980s, is not generally credited to the Supreme
Court,264 the Court has played a very strong supporting role in that movement,
both in its rhetoric 265 and in its decisions during the last two decades. The Court
has had a significant impact on the broader category of civil litigation, and this
impact is commensurate with regressive tort reform in general. The Supreme
Court has, in effect, put its imprimatur on the movement.
Andrew Siegel, in a careful and thorough piece, paints a picture of the
Rehnquist Court as a Court with an overarching hostility to litigation. 266 As
262

James E. Robertson, The Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates as "Outsiders"

and the

CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188-89 (2002). President
William Clinton signed this bill into law.
263
See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 105 app.1. The notable exception is in the
area of the First Amendment.
264
Most of it has been carried out state by state through legislation and in their courts. See,
e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 44.

Note the many jibes, mainly coming from Justice Scalia, in the cases limiting the ability of
plaintiffs to seek relief in the courts. Siegel, supra note 29, at 1124 n. 102. Note also the rhetoric
in the punitive damages cases of damages "run[ning] wild." Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
266
Siegel, supra note 29, at 1097. Although Siegel is not the first to identify this attitude, he is
the first to draw it out as an overarching theme of the Court. For earlier, more partial references to
265
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Siegel states, "[i]n case after case and in wildly divergent areas of the law, the
Rehnquist Court has expressed a profound hostility to litigation., 267 Siegel's
point is not to dismiss the voluminous existing explanatory narratives of the
Court, such as federalism, conservatism, or even judicial supremacy, but to
show that they are incomplete and misleading without an understanding of the
Court's hostility to litigation. 68
This hostility is not an even-handed hostility to all litigants alike. It
manifests itself most prominently to the disadvantage of plaintiffs, and common
people, and to the advantage of defendants and legal fictions, namely states and
other corporate entities. 269 Siegel finds it curious that this hostility coexists with
"the Court's concurrent commitment to an aggressive form of judicial supremacy, ' 270 and he explores a range of explanatory vectors, not least of which is the
strong correlation between a conservative social vision and the cases in which
the Court has shown the most hostility to litigation, as well as when it seems to
most zealously promote its own supremacy. 271 Other explanatory vectors include an oversimplified view of separation of powers, 272 and the structure and
sociology of the American legal profession, within which there is a tendency for
the best-trained and best-connected lawyers (including the members of the
Court and their associates) to congregate in civil defense and constitutional litigation rather than in personal injury. 3
The democracy-based explanation, which is not directly pursued by
Siegel, but which is consistent with both Supreme Court elitism and certain aspects of a conservative social vision, is that the Court lacks sufficient concern
for democratic values. The point is not to simply trot out the old hobby horse of
counter-majoritarianism (i.e., the Court is an activist Court with little respect for

the idea, see Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence,State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalizationof FederalLaw, 31 RuTGERS L. J. 691, 706-19 (2000) (identifying "hostility to litigation" as one of the themes behind the Court's 1999 sovereign immunity decisions).
267
Siegel, supra note 29, at 1107. While this Article tracks Siegel's treatment of the Court's
hostility to litigation, the treatment below focuses on how that hostility translates into undermining democratic values.
268
Id. at 1102.
269 As Siegel notes, "Any survey of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation, however cursory, must begin with the obvious: In myriad ways, the Court has made life very difficult for civil
plaintiffs." Id. at 1117. Siegel notes that while the court is generally hostile to litigation, it treats
"plaintiffs' litigation" as particularly "demeaning and disreputable." Id. at 1201.
270 Id. at 1098.
271
Id. at 1199-1200.
272
Id. at 1200-01. Although Siegel sees this as one possible explanatory vector, he notes that it
is not an explanation that is consistent with a number of the court's decisions. ld. at 1201 n.458
(referring to the discussion in the article's text accompanying footnotes 109-10. The implausibility of this explanation is further explored below).
273
Id. at 1202.
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other democratic institutions),2 74 but that many of the Court's decisions undermine democratic accountability and fail to accord equal concern and respect for
everyone who is affected by its decisions.
Those cases, which evidence the Court's hostility to litigation, most directly include cases involving the Court's reluctance to provide remedies for
those persons whose rights have been violated, official immunity and feeshifting statutes cases, punitive damages cases, and cases that involve the Federal Arbitration Act and state sovereign immunity cases.
1.

Constricting remedies

A number of authors have commented on the Court's constriction of
remedies for those whose rights have been violated.275 Andrew Siegel, who
analyzes four paradigm cases, 6 out of many,277 in which the Rehnquist Court
has undermined the traditional view that rights imply remedies for their violation 2 7 8 notes that, in every case, there was an acknowledged or assumed injury
279
to a defined legal interest and a Supreme Court precedent supporting relief.

274

See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question

Doctrine and the Rise of JudicialSupremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Louis D. Bilionis,
The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481, 495 (2002); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 130 (2001). Note that courts are not categorically countermajoritarian. Given the evidence above concerning the "representative" branches and Richard
Abel's work, there is no reason to think that the courts are less likely to provide democratically
justifiable decisions in the area of torts. Abel, supra note 37.
275
See Goldberg, supra note 15; Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity,
2002 SuP. CT. REV. 343 (2002); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary,
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003); Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in
Lochner's Legacy, The Court's Assault on New Property, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 321, 341-42, 342351, 360 (2006).
276
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (finding that no private right of action exists to
enforce the disparate impact regulations barring entities who receive federal funds from adopting
policies that have the "effect" of discriminating on the basis of race); Correctional Serv. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (private remedy for a Constitutional right violation is not available
for a federal prisoner held in a private correctional facility in a claim against the corporation for
violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment."); GreatWest Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (holding that a remedial provision
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) does not provide a right of
recovery); Gonzaga Univ.. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (holding that private individuals harmed
by violations of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) cannot seek
redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
277
Siegel lists several cases but does not include Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)
(dismissing respondent's case for failing to establish that she had a property right in the enforcement of a mandatory restraining order, thereby failing to establish that she had a right that was
worthy of procedural due process protection which would provide a right to sue under 42 U.S.C. §
1983).
278
Siegel, supra note 29, at 1118-29.
Id. at 1122.
279
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The Court, at times, attempts to justify these decisions on democratic
grounds.28 ° Siegel phrases the Court's democratic justification in terms of ensuring that coercive sanctions are not imposed without careful communal deliberation. 281 This line of argument is rooted in separation of powers concerns,
namely concerns that the courts should not encroach on the prerogatives of representative institutions to make the law and determine whether there should be
remedies for the breach of law.282 In a number of these cases, the Court appears
to engage in a dialogue with Congress and/or the states, imploring them to speak
more clearly, if they wish to create private remedies.283
However, this explanation of the Court's decisions is undermined by the
Court's assault on § 1983 claims. That assault is in direct conflict with the spirit
and the letter of § 1983, under which Congress explicitly provided for the right
to a remedy for the violation of federal law, including constitutional law.284
This is evidenced, not only by some of the cases mentioned above, including
Gonzaga28528and Castle Rock 6 but also in § 1983 cases where the court has
expanded official immunity from damages and made it harder to recoup attorneys' fees.287 These decisions fly in the face of democratic concerns, not only
by undermining "democratically" passed legislation, but also by undermining
mechanisms designed to help consolidate and protect democratic rights.
A similar pattern is found in the Court's expansion of the doctrine of
qualified immunity over the last twenty years, which has resulted in more stringent standards for determining a clearly established right, as well as greater tolerance for errors of judgments on the part of officials claiming the immunity.2 88
280

Id. at 1129.

281

Id.

282

Siegel refers to CorrectionalServices Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67-69 (2002), which

discusses a number of cases limiting remedies to civil litigants on the grounds of separation of
powers. Siegel, supra note 29, at n. 119.
283

Siegel refers to Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280-81 (2002) (describing the

need for congress to speak clearly of its intention to create a private remedy). Siegel, supra note
29, at 1129 n.119. See also Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005) (quoting Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5(a)-(b) (1999)). It is questionable whether the Court in Castle Rock was
genuine. See Roederer, supra note 275, at 341-42,342-51, 360.
2M
Oddly, the Court uses arguments and policy drawn from implied right of action cases (under
which separation of powers concerns justifiably act to limit the court in creating rights of action)
to limit § 1983 claims. This is odd because § 1983 was specifically enacted to provide rights of
action, and thus, the Court is undermining the separation of powers when it denies such claims.
See Siegel, supra note 29, at 1126; Roederer, supra note 275, at 321-69.
285
GonzagaUniv., 536 U.S. at 273.
Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 748.
286
287

See Siegel, supranote 29, at 1126, 1130.

288

Id. at 1130-31 n.123 (collecting cases involving the doctrine). See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543

U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam). But there are a handful of cases where the Court has limited
overly expansive interpretations/applications of immunity by circuit courts. See, e.g., Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (holding that the circuit court erred in applying a "rigid gloss" to
the qualified immunity standard that denied relief to tort plaintiffs if there was no prior case with
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The result is that it is harder in these cases for victims, who have had recognized
289
rights violated, to vindicate those rights.
2.

Access to fee-shifting

Fee-shifting legislation constituted a very important and progressive development for civil litigants, as it allowed them to claim attorney's fees when
they prevailed in their cases. 290 This development accompanied the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and was later incorporated into the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act
of 1976. That reform helped to ensure that the rights won on paper, and which
evidence the coming of age of American democracy, could actually be vindicated in practice. It not only made it easier for victims to obtain counsel, bring
claims, and receive remedies for the wrongs they suffered, but it had the further
purpose and effect of keeping those hard-won democratic gains on track. Plaintiffs in these cases are not merely vindicating private wrongs, but helping to
vindicate and deter public wrongs.
Again, however, the Rehnquist Court whittled away at this mechanism
for vindicating those rights by narrowing down the class of "prevailing plaintiffs" and by devaluing the importance of having the Constitution itself, and
one's rights under the Constitution, vindicated. In other words, devaluing constitutional rights is not merely the result of whittling away mechanisms for vindicating rights; more importantly, it is also a means through which it is
achieved. The Court denied "prevailing party" status to plaintiffs in cases
where: the court's decision that the plaintiffs' rights had been violated was not
entered into a formal declaratory judgment or injunction, when the judgment did
not provide a "substantial benefit" to the claimant, when the claimant receives
only nominal damages, and/or when the claimant's suit compels the abandon-

"materially similar" facts where a constitutional violation had been established); Johnson v. Jones,
515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995) (unanimously holding, contrary to the position of a number of circuits,
that an order denying summary judgment in a qualified immunity case because of uncertainty
about the factual sufficiency of the allegations was not immediately appealable).
289 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1131-32. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative"
Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CI-n. L. REv. 429, 482-84 (2002);
Jackson, supra note 266, at 691, 706, 707 (locating the Supreme Court's 1999 sovereign immunity
decisions in the context of a variety of other anti-litigation initiatives of the Rehnquist Court and
offering the Court's "hostility to litigation" as one of many overlapping themes motivating those
decisions). David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of ConstitutionalRights, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23 (1989) (arguing that
the doctrine is based on right wing judicial activism). The push for the immunity of corporate
entities is not confined to the state. FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 33-34.
290 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243, tit. II & tit. VII. See,
e.g., Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1622, 1623, 1636;
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327; Siegel, supra note
29, at 1136.
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ment of an illegal practice or rule, but is not accompanied by a binding judicial
decree.291
These cases appear to deny the congressionally mandated relief on
rather narrow and technical grounds, which are not supported by the separation
of powers or the democracy-reinforcing purposes of the provisions themselves.
The cases, which narrowly read "prevailing party" to exclude those whose rights
are vindicated but whose damages are nominal or insubstantial, completely undervalues the federal and constitutional rights these provisions were designed to
help safeguard. The fact that money damages are inadequate or inappropriate in
some of these cases, or that specific performance is more appropriate, does not
mean that a vindication of the right is less important or less valuable. It demeans the legislation, and the rights it was designed to protect, to act as if it was
designed to only protect losses that could be, or are, converted into money damages. Further, to deny the shifting of fees in these cases does the most damage
2 92
to the purpose of the legislation, which was to encourage these types of suits.
This is because it is exactly in those cases, where there are few monetary damages, that it will be most difficult for plaintiffs to secure adequate legal representation. Without monetary damages or fee-shifting, the plaintiffs incur the
attorney's fees.
3.

Punitive damages

The Supreme Court has also weighed in on punitive damages. The
Rehnquist Court, unlike any Court before, sought to limit the availability of
punitive damages. Siegel is correct to point out that punitive damages are something of a lightning rod for tort reform advocates, yet he is incorrect to think that
this is because they "represent a substantial share of the costs of our current
regime. 29 3 Punitive damages are in fact very rare, 294 and although awards may
291

See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532

U.S. 598, 605 (2001); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1,
3-4 (1988) (per curiam); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759-60 (1987); Siegel, supra note 29, at
1137.
292
See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 (1991).
293
Siegel, supra note 29, at 1148. See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 60-65; Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: EmpiricalAnalyses Using the Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263
(2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., State Courts], available at http://ssm.com/abstract=912309.
As Eisenberg has stated elsewhere, "[m]isperceptions about juries and punitive damages are especially strong. Contrary to popular belief, juries rarely award such damages, and award them especially rarely in products liability and medical malpractice cases. Rather, juries tend to award
punitive damages in intentional misconduct cases. When juries do award punitive damages, they
do so in ways that relate strongly to compensatory awards." Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries,
Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 745 (2002) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., EmpiricalStudy].
294
Eisenberg found that judges award punitive damages in about 4% of decided cases and
juries in about 5% of decided cases. Eisenberg et al., State Courts, supra note 293, at 268. How-
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be extreme in some cases, the numbers are insignificant in light of the vast majority of cases.295
The changes in this area have moved from requiring certain procedural
safeguards to substantively limiting the amount of damages.29 6 Not unlike the
fee-shifting limitation, here, the Court is pegging its substantive limits on compensatory damages,297 thus, making cases that do not involve high levels of economic damages harder to bring. 298 Again, similar to the fee-shifting cases, limiting punitive damages, particularly in this fashion, reduces the efficacy of punitive damages as a way of deterring the egregious behavior of defendants.
Whereas above, the Court undermined the role that fee-shifting played in securing federal and constitutional rights, here, limitations on punitive damages also
limits the public policy role that punitive damages play in deterring some of the
worst forms of corporate irresponsibility.299
ever, given that these numbers reflect cases in which plaintiffs win, they only represent about half
of all cases tried, and since less than 5% of cases go to court, while the rest settle, this makes the
number of punitive damages cases quite de minimus (below 3 in 10,000).
295
Eisenberg's study indicates that most cases involve awards of under $100,000 (60%); over
23% are under $10,000, and less than 11% are over $1 million. Id. at 270.
296 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (striking down a
damage award as excessive); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
426, 443 (2001) (holding that appellate courts should review trial court determinations as to the
constitutionality of punitive damage awards de novo); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 585-86 (1996) (striking down a damage award as excessive); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415, 418 (1994) (holding that the lax standard for appellate review of punitive damages
mandated by the Oregon Constitution violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446, 465-66 (1993) (reviewing a
punitive damage award for excessiveness but finding it within constitutional limits); Pac. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (reviewing both Alabama's method of assessing punitive
damages and the magnitude of an award in a particular case but finding no constitutional problem); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989) (holding that
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards
and declining to set aside a punitive damage award as excessive); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76-80 (1988) (discussing but declining to answer on prudential grounds
major constitutional questions regarding punitive damage awards); Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1 (2004). Another punitive damages case, Philip Morris USA v. Williams (05-1256), is before the Supreme
Court this term.
297
In Campbell, although the Court would not make a bright line ratio, it stated that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will
satisfy due process." 538 U.S. at 410. However, the Court did note that "ratios greater than those
that this Court has previously upheld may comport with due process where a particularly egreId. (citing Gore, 517
gious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages .
U.S. at 582).
298
Siegel, supra note 29, at 1147.
299 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 355
(2003); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 381 (2000); FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 42-46. Siegel
notes that the Court is particularly hostile to litigation in cases where litigation is meant to achieve
greater societal purposes. Siegel, supra note 29, at 1160 n.255.
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Arbitration clauses

The Court has also gone out of its way to broadly construe the Federal
Arbitration Act. 300 Arbitration, or contracting out of court, is one way of circumventing an institution that is unresponsive to special interest pressures.
There may be a tendency to think that, since arbitration is a form of alternative
dispute resolution, it is thereby progressive. 30 1 At the very least, some might
think that it is no less progressive than regular litigation and should be given
equal footing. Although the Court's recognition of arbitration may have begun
as an effort to put arbitration on an equal footing with litigation, it has ended up
as "a policy-driven assault on the wisdom and propriety of litigation as a
mechanism for resolving such disputes. 3 °2 There is little question that arbitration has its benefits, particularly in terms of costs to the parties. For equalbargaining partners, arbitration may, in fact, be superior to litigation.
The Court's practice, however, has been to ignore the bargaining disparities of the parties. As Siegel states, "[ilt has consistently enforced form arbitration agreements that shift cases from courts to alternative forums without
regard for the practical consequences to potential plaintiffs. 3 °3 There are at
30

Siegel, supra note 29, at 1117-18
As Garth notes, "mandatory arbitration... gained support from idealistic academic studies.
• . promoting 'procedural justice.' The idea was that arbitration allows individuals to tell their
stories, and therefore litigants perceive the process as a more legitimate form of justice than the
usual result of litigation-a negotiated settlement. Both mediation and arbitration contain a tradition-now seemingly muted-that the results are supposed to be better than strict enforcement of the
law." Garth, supra note 204, at 929.
302
Siegel, supra note 29, at 1141.
303 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1117-18. The literature critiquing the Court on this point is vast.
See e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REV.
331, 401 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence will allow "birds of
prey" to "sup on workers, consumers, shippers, passengers, and franchisees"); David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing Small Print to ProtectBig Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age
of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 36 (1997) ("The Supreme Court has created a
monster."); Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionalityof the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration:A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1997) (critiquing arbitration case law for increasingly favoring
arbitral forums without regard for basic fairness or rule of law norms). See also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TuL. L. Rev. 1945
(1996); Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 293 (1999); Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for
New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairnessin Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1039
(1998); David M. Kinnecome, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a
Method of Weakening the Substantive ProtectionsAfforded by Employment Rights Statutes?, 79
B. U. L. REv. 745 (1999); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 29 (1998); Margo E. K. Reder, Arbitrating SecuritiesIndustry Employment Discrimination Claims: Restructuringa System to Ensure Fairness, 2 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 19 (1999); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has
Pre-Dispute[Mandatory]Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. Rev. 1069 (1998); Jean
R. Sternlight, Panaceaor Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preferencefor Bind301
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least five significant effects of allowing companies to bind consumers (and
smaller, less powerful companies) to arbitration. First, the large company gets
to choose a venue that is more congenial.30 Second, it gets a forum that has less
due process than a court 3° (e.g., in terms of discovery, the right to a jury, 306 and
judicial review). 30 7 Third, it can oust the possibility of punitive damages. 3° 8
Fourth, it can eliminate the possibility of victims joining together in class actions to bring a suit.3 9 Finally, as Richard Posner states, parties are not entitled
to awards that are "correct or even reasonable, since neither error nor clear error,
nor even gross error is a ground for vacating an award."3 " All of these factors
benefit the few, at the expense of the majority. As Bryant Garth, Dean at
Southwestern Law School, suggests:
It is not the simplistic bias of decision-making structured for the
employers or companies to win. Instead, the bias is found in a
system in which only a few constituencies are comfortable making their arguments and confident that their concerns will be
understood, even if they lose some cases. The bias is also in a
ing Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637 (1996); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict
Management, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 831 (2001).
304 See, e.g. Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing a venue provision in an arbitration clause written in fine print on the cruise ticket that was significantly more
congenial and convenient for the Cruise Lines than for the consumer plaintiff).
305
"Just as important to anyone concerned with the morality of law is the fact that the arbitrator
can decide a case without regard for the law or the facts in a case. There is no predictable outcome, no procedural protection." Deborah W. Post, DismantlingDemocracy: Common Sense and
the ContractJurisprudenceof Frank Easterbrook,16 TouRo L. REv 1205, 1236 (2000). See also
Garth, supra note 204.
306
This arguably undermines one of the main democratic components of our system of justice
(both civil and criminal).
307
Thomas S. Meriwether, Limiting Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards under the Federal
ArbitrationAct: Striking the Right Balance, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 739 (2007).
308
See Stephan J.Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's
Role in Punishmentand FederalPreemptionof State Law, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 529, 531 (1994).
309 Eliminating class actions means that many consumers with small harms simply will not
pursue claims, thereby allowing business to defraud large numbers of consumers in small
amounts. FEINmAN, supra note 9, at 104. It is only through joining as a class that they can in any
way approximate the power of big business. Id. at 80. See also Post, supra note 305, at 1226. In
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997),
Judge Easterbrook upheld an "arbitration agreement" that was not negotiated, but simply shipped
with the plaintiff's computer binding the plaintiff/consumer to its terms unless the consumer
shipped the computer back to the manufacturer at the consumer's own cost within 30 days (a
rolling shrink wrap contract); FEIMAN, supra note 9, at 88. This is just one way of forming binding contracts with little to no notice, much less bargaining. In addition to the normal boilerplate
adhesion contract, others include shrink-wraps, browse-wraps and click-wraps in which the
agreement is packaged with the product, put on a website or on the computer screen to click. lid
at 86.
IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assocs., 266 F. 3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001).
310
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process that selects neutrals who will be safe for the leading
lawyers and clients-whoever controls the selection-and rejects those who appear too political, too unreliable, or too risky
even on the basis of cultural stereotypes. 3 1
This is as undemocratically tailored as a justice system can be. It is perfectly suited for employers and companies who are repeat players, but everyone
else must simply take it or go without.312 Deborah Post, in describing the Seventh Circuit Court case of Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,3 13 stated:
The Gateway case ... threatens the democratic process on two
levels. Not only does it create a model of contract formation
that gives entire control over the terms of the agreement to one
side, it also deprives the less powerful party, the individual consumer, of the only mechanism she has to directly confront behavior that is predatory, abusive or simply overreaching.314
5.

States rights

One of the most dramatic areas of constitutional change has been in the
area of "states rights." The Court has brought new life to state sovereign immunity in a host of cases, through a diverse set of mechanisms.3 15 The result, as
with many of the cases above involving rights of action, qualified immunity,
and arbitration, is that colorable claims are dismissed without regard for their
Garth, supra note 204, at 933.
Just as the Court abandoned its fidelity to separation of powers, the Court here abandons its
fidelity to federalism when it comes into conflict with its desire to limit access to the courts
through the FAA. Siegel, supra note 29, at 1142-43. See e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,
489 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempts state law protecting access to courts in wage collection actions).
311

312

313

105 F.3d 1147.

Post, supra note 305, at 1235.
315
Siegel, supra note 29, at 1153-55 nn.219-28. Siegel summarizes the area: "[T]he Court has
reaffirmed and firmly constitutionalized the expansive and counter-textual reading of the Eleventh
Amendment .... held that Congress may not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
under any of its Article I powers, developed a fairly intrusive test to determine whether Congress
has properly abrogated the states' immunity pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers, and
applied that test with increasing rigor and scepticism. At the same time, the Court has-without
relying on the Eleventh Amendment or any other textual provision-held that the Constitution's
structure requires that the states be accorded sovereign immunity from suits in their own courts
(absent their consent) and from federal administrative proceedings that bear significant indicia of
adjudication. In a variety of less well-known cases, the Court has also narrowed the wellestablished doctrine whereby individuals may, notwithstanding sovereign immunity, seek injunctions against state officials in their official capacity, made it easier for state officials to obtain
dismissal of lawsuits on sovereign immunity grounds at an early stage in the litigation process,
and overruled precedent suggesting that a state does not posses full Eleventh Amendment immunity when it engages in routine commercial activity." Id. at 1153-54.
314

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/7

54

Roederer: Democracy and Tort Law in America: The Counter-Revolution

DEMOCRACY AND TORT LA W IN AMERICA

2008]
merit. 316

Therefore, victims of illegal government conduct are denied access to
justice.31 7 It also means that one important mechanism for holding the government accountable to the people is eroded, and with it, respect for the rule of law.
The justification for the revival of state immunity is a somewhat odd anthropomorphism of the state.31 8 The idea is that states are somehow endowed
with sovereignty, the likes of which make them susceptible to moral harm or
assaults to their dignity. The concept is a throwback to the days in which Kings
and Queens ruled the land, when they were "the sovereign," wholly capable of
suffering indignity at the hands of others. There is considerable debate as to
whether or not dignity was the crucial animating idea behind the 11 th Amendment and sovereign immunity.31 9 Like many issues in legal history, there is
ample authority on both sides and the issue's resolution is beyond the scope of
this Article.
Even if dignity was the original rationale for the 11 th Amendment, it
was a different notion of dignity than the one called forth by the Court today.
The dignity, referred to before, consisted of the notion that sovereigns were
equal and that it was inappropriate (or undignified) to subject one sovereign to
the courts of another sovereign. 320 This purportedly undermined the equality of
sovereigns. 32 1 However, the modern focus is on the indignity of being brought
into court (even the state's own court). While the former view sounded in notions about the equality of sovereigns, if Siegel is correct, the modern notion is
not animated by equality, but by a type of elitism which places the state sovereign above its citizens. Siegel notes:
As the Court sees it, compelling an unwilling state to defend a
private lawsuit for damages threatens state dignity for much the
316

Siegel, supra note 29, at 1163.

317

Id.

318

Siegel notes that Justice Thomas has provided the fullest articulation of the dignity princi-

ple, that "[tihe preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord the States the dignity
that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities." Id. at 1157 (citing Fed. Mar. Comm'n v.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002)).
319
Note that the dignity rationale for sovereign immunity was only used sporadically. It came
up in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), and then in Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S.
443 (1887). It was only raised again in 1959, where it was not relied upon. Petty v. Tenn.-Miss.
Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 n.l (1959). As the court pointed out in that case, "More than
the dignity of a sovereign state was probably at issue, however. When the Eleventh Amendment
was proposed, many states were in financial difficulties and had defaulted on their debts. The
states could therefore use the new amendment not only in defense of theoretical sovereignty but
also in a more practical way to forestall suits by individual creditors!" Id. (quoting MARIAN D.
IRISH & JAMES W. PROTHRO, THE PoLmcs OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 123 (1959)).

320 This was the kind of dignity at play which was rejected by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens
v. Virginia. Siegel, supra note 29, at 1161.
321
Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-DoctrinalPerspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1
(2003).
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same reason and in much the same way that subjecting a private
party to such a suit diminishes the dignity and threatens the
status of that private party.32 2
In other words, it is part of a visceral reaction to having to defend oneself in court. However, modem states (whether true sovereign states or elements of a federal state system) are artificial entities, similar to corporations and
associations, and do not possess the moral qualities needed to have dignity.
While the earlier conception of equal dignity of states vis-a-vis other states
resonates with democratic impulses (although it too raises concerns in today's
global interdependent world), 2 the modem form of the idea is decidedly undemocratic. It is a throwback to pre-democratic times, when the sovereign
made, imposed and was above the law. This is inconsistent with notions of
equality before the law. The Court, in effect, is choosing to protect the "dignity" of the state over the rights of plaintiff citizens. It is undermining "the rule
of law" and equality before the law, thereby
324elevating "rule by the sovereign"
and undermining democratic accountability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the findings addressed in Parts III and IV above, there is little
hope that this work, or anyone else's academic work, is going to revitalize
American democracy on its own. The present downward spiraling cycle will
not be easy to reverse, particularly in the "age of truthiness." This is not to say
that critical work has no place, or no chance of impact. There is always some
hope that the "age of truthiness" will pass and that this piece, like the works of
professors Abel, Baker, Feinman and Rustad, among others, will find some traction, and will help to demystify what is at stake in modem tort reform. Demystification is a necessary, although insufficient step, towards transparency, accountability and a revitalized democracy. Although many authors have come
close to challenging tort "reform" on democratic grounds, few, if any, have chosen to be so blunt. The arguments in this Article are designed to place the preSiegel, supra note 29, at 1160.
323 See, e.g., DARREL MOELLENDORF, COSMOPOLrrAN JusTIcE (2002) (critiquing John Rawls's
statist approach to global justice on Rawlsian grounds).
324
Although beyond the scope of this paper, the present administration's attack on the rule of
law should be noted. The attack has taken many forms since the beginning of the "war on terror,"
but a few recent examples include the president's abuse of signing statements to selectively enforce the law as well as proposed amendments to the War Crimes Act to insulate government
officials from suits based on war crimes committed against detainees. See, e.g., Press Release,
American Bar Association, Blue-Ribbon Task Force Finds President Bush's Signing Statements
Undermine Separation of Powers (July 24, 2006), http://www.abanet.org/media/
releases/news072406.html; R. Jeffrey Smith, Detainee Abuse Charges Feared: Shield Sought
From '96 War Crimes Act, WASH. POST, July 28, 2006, at Al, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/27/AR2006072701908_pf.html.
322

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/7

56

Roederer: Democracy and Tort Law in America: The Counter-Revolution

20081

DEMOCRACY AND TORT LAW IN AMERICA

sent course of tort "reform" in sharp relief against the unreflective idea that the
American ship of state and law has been sailing a steady democratic course for
over 200 years. Sometimes it takes a clear sighting of the precipice before people are willing to change course.
A prime example is captured in the American Law Institute Restatement
(Third) of Products Liability. 325 Although the reporters' sincerity is dubious in a
number of respects,32 6 their "restatement" of the law placed the course of products liability in sharp relief against the path of Section 402A of American Law
Institute Restatement (Second) of Torts.327 Their perhaps overzealous crystallization of the death of strict liability in product design and failure to warn cases
(§ 2); the death of the consumer expectations test, and the requirement that the
plaintiff prove the existence of reasonable alternative design (§ 2(b)); the nearly
complete immunity given to prescription drugs (§ 6(c)); and the pass given to
"unavoidably unsafe" products such as drugs, cigarettes and alcohol; 328 made it
very clear how much the paths of the two Restatements diverged. They also
made it apparent how much was being lost on the path to the Third Restatement
from the perspective of consumer protection and corporate responsibility.
Whether one thinks the Third Restatement was merely a cold, but brutally accurate, obituary or a politically-motivated attempt to put a bounty on the head of

325

RESTATEMENT (TI-RD) OF TORTS: PRODuCTS LIABILITY (1998).

326

The fact that they attempt to maintain that their restatement is not political, but merely a

restatement of existing laws is as hard to accept as their assertion that the choice between the riskutility approach to products liability and the consumer expectation approach is merely a pragmatic
choice, a matter of getting it right, like figuring out the boiling point of water, rather than a choice
deeply rooted in political as well as principled considerations of justice. See James A. Henderson,
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan and Other Countries Can Learn from the New
American Restatement of ProductsLiability, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 14 (1999).
327
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
328
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY. Earlier outlines of the present
work included a section depicting the rise of consumer protection and strict liability in democratically accountable Europe and the fall of strict liability and consumer protection in "manufacturer's
accountable America." Luke Nottage, in his comparative study of products liability in Japan the
U.S., E.U., and Australia, depicts EU law as making steady pro-consumer progress from the 1960s
to the present, Australia making rather steady progress from the 1960s until about 2000, Japan
making very little pro-consumer progress until 1994, when it adopted its Product Liability Law
which was modeled on the E.U. directive, and the United States, whose pro-consumer product
liability law peaked in the early 1980s and started a rather steep decline until the present. Luke
Nottage, Comparing Product Safety and Liability Law in Japan:From Minamata to Mad Cows and Mitsubishi,in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 336 (Duncan Fairgrieve ed.,

2005). See also Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European ProductsLiability More Protective Than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 985, 994
(1998); Josephine Liu, Two Roads Diverged in a Yellow Wood: The European Community Stays
on the Path to Strict Liability, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1940 (2004). Cf. Reimann, supra note 67,
at 801 (somewhat more cautious about the E.U. being more protective of consumers); Jane Stapleton, ProductsLiability in the United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 TEx. INT'L L.J. 45, 53-61
(1999) (arguing that the E.U. also uses a negligence standard in design and failure to warn cases).
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strict liability,329 it brought the issue out in stark relief. As Ellen Wertheimer
notes, 'The Third Restatement... made it impossible for
courts to ignore what
°
they had done, and many did not like what they saw.33
Once the dust settled, the courts realized that the risks and losses did not
go away, but simply shifted. In fact, those risks and loses were shifted onto the
shoulders of innocent consumers, who are not only at a disadvantage from the
perspective of making products safer, but who also are not equally equipped to
insure for, absorb or spread the losses they suffer. 331 Although the campaign to
see the corporate producer as the symbol of American freedom-like a mustang
tethered to a shrub in the desert of welfarist tort law, being fed upon by greedy
parasitic lawyers and consumers-persists,3 32 the reality is that, when horses run
wild, people get trampled. Under the Third Restatement, those who trample
now have a much better chance at avoiding responsibility and liability for those
losses, even though they: 1) profit from putting their products into the stream of
commerce; 2) are best placed to test and make products safe or warn of their
hazards; and 3) are in the best position to insure against, absorb and spread the
risks and losses. This not only raises the risk of being trodden upon (by undermining the deterrent effect of products liability law), but it also raises the risk
that once trodden upon, the consumer will bear the loss.
329

See FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 40. The idea that § 2(b) represents a wish list for manufacturers has been repeatedly cited since it was first stated by Frank Vadall in 1997. See, e.g., id.;
Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1700, 1727 n. 116 (2003)
(citing Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W. 2d 727, 751 n.16 (Wis. 2001) (quoting
Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation is Prepared: The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Product Liability section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 261
(1997))); Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the Third Restatement, and the
Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 889, 927 n. 116 (2005); Aaron Arnold, Note, Rethinking Design Defect Law: Should Arizona Adopt the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: ProductsLiability?, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 173, 174 (2003).
330
Wertheimer, supra note 329, at 923. She does note that some courts did follow the Third
Restatement, even though it conflicted with earlier precedent. Id.
331 As Reimann notes, "[i]n the United States, accident victims are not nearly protected comprehensively. In 1997, 16% of all Americans and 37% of the low-income population had no
health coverage at all, and the number kept rising. Only 66% of the adult workforce has disability
benefits, and these benefits are usually less than ample. All States have enacted workers compensation schemes but the compensation they pay is fairly low and often insufficient to make ends
meet. Overall, social and workers' insurance cover only about three-fifths of the economic consequences of accidents, forcing victims to bear the remaining 40% themselves." Reimann, supra
note 67, at 828.
332
See, e.g., Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: FundamentalPrinciples
Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REv. 645, 645 (2003) ("The free enterprise system is the engine that drives America's healthy economy, the benefits of which necessarily include inherent
risks. Unfortunately, many facets of America's civil justice system operate to shift all of those
risks to the entrepreneurs who produce the consumer goods and services that make people's lives
easier or more pleasant .... The tort system has undergone a transformation from one designed
solely to redress wrongs to one focusing more and more on criminal-style retribution and redistribution of wealth."). Although it is doubtful that this statement was ever true, it may have come
closer to the truth some 30 years ago. It certainly is not true today.
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Given the courts' reaction to the Restatement (Third) of Products Liability (1998), there is some hope that, if people see clearly what is at stake in
the current wave of tort reform, they may actually react progressively, putting
torts back to work for democratic progress.
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APPENDIX

Table 1
Economic Inequality: Lowest 10% compared to medium income; highest 10%
compared to medium income; the Decile ratio of P90/P10; and the Gini coefficient333
COUNTRIES

PlO

P90

P90/Pl0

GINI

Finland 2000

57%

164%

2.87719

0.247

Netherlands 1999

56%

167%

2.98214

0.248

Norway 2000

57%

159%

2.78947

0.251

Sweden 2000

57%

168%

2.94737

0.252

Germany 2000

54%

173%

3.2037

0.252

Austria 2000

55%

173%

3.1455

0.26

Luxembourg 2000

66%

215%

3.25758

0.26

Denmark 1992

54%

155%

2.8704

0.263

Belgium 2000

53%

174%

3.283

0.277

Switzerland 2000

54%

182%

3.3704

0.28

France 1994

54%

191%

3.537

0.288

Canada 2000

48%

188%

3.9167

0.302

Ireland 2000

41%

189%

4.6098

0.323

Italy 2000

44%

199%

4.5227

0.333

Spain 2000

44%

209%

4.75

0.34

United Kingdom 1999

47%

215%

4.5745

0.345

United States 2000

39%

210%

5.3846

0.369

Average

51.76%

184%

3.65

0.28765

Standard Deviation

6.94

19.83

0.812

0.04

333

Brandolini & Smeeding, supra note 58, at 22 fig. 1.
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Table 2
334
Inequality: Gini coefficients before and after taxes and benefits
State
Finland
Netherlands
Sweden
Austria
Germany
Belgium
France
Canada
Switzerland
Ireland
Italy
Spain
United Kingdom
United States
Average

Market Gini
38
39
45
43
46
47
49
41
39
44
46
47
50
47
44.36

Post-benefits
25
25
25
26
26
28
29
30
30
32
33
34
35
37
29.64

reduction
34%
36%
44%
39%
42%
41%
47%
27%
20%
27%
27%
28%
31%
22%
33.21%

Table 3
Inequalities in Wealth: Gini coefficients based on net worth3 35
State
Japan
Spain
Italy
Australia
Netherlands
Canada
Germany
France
United Kingdom
United States
Switzerland
Average
Stand. Deviation

Gini
.547
.565
.609
.622
.649
.663
.671
.73
.73
.801
.803
.6718
.0864

Table based on extracted data. Brandolini & Smeedling, supra note 58, at 24 fig.2 (based
on the Luxemburg Income Study).
335
Table based on data taken from DAVIES ET AL., supra note 69, at 48 tbl.10b.
334
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Table 4
336
VAP statistics by country
Country

Italy
Belgium
Austria
Sweden
Netherlands
Denmark
Canada
Germany
Norway
Finland
Spain
Ireland
United Kingdom
France
Luxembourg
Switzerland
United States
Average

336

VAP Parliamentary
voter turnout 19452001
92%
85%
84%
84%
84%
84%
83%
80%
79%
78%
76%
75%
74%
67%
64%
52%
48%
76%

Derived from statistics of averages of voting age population ratios across 169 countries in

parliamentary elections from 1945-2001 compiled by the International Institute for Democratic
and Electoral Assistance. PINTOR ET AL., supra note 112, at 75, 83-84.
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Table 5

337
UNICEF Child Well-Being Table (2007)

1

Netherlands

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Sweden
Denmark
Finland
Spain
Switzerland
Norway
Italy

10
11

Belgium
GeKany

9

Republic of Ireland

12 Canada
13 Greece
14 Poland
15 1Czech Republic
16 1France
17 Portugal
18 Australia
19 Hungary
20 United States
21 United Kingdom

Derived from INNOCENTI RESEARCH CENTRE, supra note 77, at 2 (this ranking is a combined
ranking based on: material well-being, family and peer relationships, health and safety, behavior
risks, and both educational well-being and subjective well-being).
337
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